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Whether and how to provide transition relief from a change in legal regime is a
question of critical importance. Legislatures and agencies effect changes to the law
constantly, and affected private actors often seek relieffrom those changes, at least
in the short term. Scholarship on transition relief therefore has focused almost
entirely on examining when transition relief might be justified and now recognizes
that there may be settings where relief from legal transitions is appropriate. Yet
largely absent from these treatments is an answer to the question of which institutional actor is best positioned to decide when legal transition relief is appropriate
and what form it should assume. In this Article, we address this issue in two parts:
Can the private market develop adequate risk-spreadingdevices such that government relief is unnecessary? If government relief is warranted, what government
actors are best suited to provide relief? We find that private markets will be unable
to provide adequate transition insurance due to insurmountablepricing difficulties,
and that the task must thus fall to governmental actors. We then analyze the available governmental actors and conclude that, in many cases, an independent agency
will be best positioned to make reliable and welfare-enhancing decisions regarding
transition relief
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INTRODucTiON

In this Article, we consider which type of institution should provide legal transition relief and analyze the form that it should take.
These questions are of great importance because the issue of legal
transition relief-whether and how an institution should compensate
parties because a change in the law adversely affects them-arises any
time a new legal regime would render illegal behavior that societal
actors previously have engaged in legally.' Relief from the legal transition can assume many forms. Transition relief may allow societal
actors already engaging in the behavior in question to continue to do
so (at least to some degree) on a going-forward basis-often called
"grandfathering."12 Or, it may offer them some form of monetary or
other compensation for the loss of that ability. Transition relief can
benefit-and, conversely, its absence can harm-producers, consumers, employees, and investors. To mention just two contemporary
examples, both greenhouse gas regulation (at both the domestic

and international levels) 3 and efforts to rein in executive compen1 Transition relief, when provided by the government, usually has assumed the form of
"grandfathering" preexisting behavior or compensating for its discontinuation. See, e.g.,
Louis Kaplow, Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework, 13 J. CONTPMP. LEGAL ISS'UES
161, 163 (2003) [hereinafter Kaplow, Transition Policy] ("[Al variety of transition provisions can be implemented, including partial or full compensation of losses and taxation of
gains, grandfathering, phase-ins, and so forth."); cf Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner,
Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543, 584 (2007) (arguing that
"Delay Rules" provide partial compensation alternative to generally assumed choice
between "just compensation" and "no compensation"). This is not always the case, however. On occasion, the government grants a firm or industry valuable new rights at the
same time that it imposes costly regulation-a type of regulatory tradeoff. The HatchWaxman Act, which established the modern regulatory regime concerning general pharmaceutical drugs, is an example of this type of regime. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.); see also Henry
Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries, 8 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV., Spring 2003, at 7, 11-14 (describing tradeoffs
involved in statutory scheme). The arguments that we offer regarding transition relief
apply equally to all types of government-provided relief, and so, in the Sections that follow,
we discuss transition relief generally, with occasional references to particular
grandfathering regimes for purposes of explication.
2 See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 Nw. U. L. REV.
1677, 1678 (2007) (discussing grandfathering of pollution sources under Clean Air Act of
1970).
3 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be
Allocated on a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51, 57-65 (2009) (highlighting unique
issues associated with allocating greenhouse gas emissions permits at international level);
Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-TradeSystem To Address Climate Change,
32 HARV. ENvTh. L. REV. 293, 320-21 (2008) (proposing system that both auctions and
grandfathers permits, with grandfathering phased out over time).
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sation at major financial corporations spark questions of transition
relief.4
For many years, the traditional law and economics literature
advocated strongly against legal transition relief. Led most prominently by Louis Kaplow, scholars argued that we should treat legal
transitions no differently from other types of transitions faced by societal actors. 5 Societal actors typically receive no aid from the government with respect to changes in technology or the economy. Similarly,
the argument went, the government should not offer legal transition
relief to private parties. 6 Recent commentary, however, questions the
scope of Kaplow's claim. Scholars have pointed out that considerations of efficiency, incentives for socially desirable investments, governmental legitimacy, and fairness might justify legal transition relief. 7
While these discussions are important, We identify two centrally
important questions for which scholars have yet to find satisfactory
answers. First, while societal actors often hedge against transitions in
technology and the economy by obtaining insurance in the private
market, such a market does not exist with respect to legal transitions.
We consider why such an insurance market has failed to develop.
See, e.g., Stephen Labaton & Eric Dash, Huge Bonus Hangs over Pay Review, N.Y.
2009, at B1 (reporting Citibank's argument that compensation it owes to
trader is exempt from federal review on ground that "it is part of a contract signed before
the law establishing the review system was passed").
5 E.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REv.
509, 533-36 (1986) [hereinafter Kaplow, Legal Transitions] (asserting that natural disasters
and government-created risks are analogous); Kaplow, Transition Policy, supra note 1, at
176-77, 179 (same).
6 Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 5, at 528-31.
7 See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 582-99 (1984) (contending absence of private
insurance against government action may necessitate compensation for government takings in order to minimize suboptimally low investments); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions,
Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH-. L.
REV. 1129, 1138-43 (1996) (arguing that without transition relief, tax incentives may
become more expensive to government); Jonathan Masur, JudicialDeference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments, 60 VAN'D. L. REV. 1021, 1025, 1041-47 (2007) (asserting
transition relief may be appropriate to induce actors to undertake socially desirable voluntary projects); Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to
Environmental Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 831, 833-34 (2009) [hereinafter
Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty] (arguing that transition relief occasionally may enhance
government legitimacy); Nash & Revesz, supra note 2, at 1727-28, 1730-32 (noting that
limited transition relief might be justified on grounds of investment efficiency and fairness); Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering,37 J.
LEGAL STuD. 37, 44-50 (2008) (advocating transition relief where social costs of transition
relief's absence outweigh social costs of transition relief); cf Saul Levmore. Changes,
Anticipations, and Reparations,99 COLUM. L. REv. 1657, 1665-66 (1999) (describing transition relief as way to compensate politically powerful interests who otherwise would stand
to lose under, and therefore would oppose, new legal regime).
4

TImEs, Aug. 13,
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Second, commentators who advocate transition relief in limited circumstances 8 do not confront the critical question of what institutional
structure is best designed to ensure that transition relief is meted out
only where justified and in an appropriately limited form.
This Article addresses these shortcomings. First, we undertake a
careful examination of the potential for a private market for legal
transition insurance. We conclude that this potential is indeed rather
low, but we also argue that most of the accepted explanations for the
absence of such a market are not plausible. The major impediment to
a private market for legal transition insurance is the chore of pricing.
While this conclusion ultimately supports the view that a private insurance market is unlikely to arise in the short term, it also suggests that
a functioning market is not the pipe dream that many have thought it
to be. It is conceivable that information and derivative markets might
facilitate pricing for insurers. In the end, however, we remain doubtful
that information markets robust enough to sustain a functioning private insurance market can arise.
Concluding that the likelihood of an imminent private market
solution to the problem of legal transitions is low, we turn to the question of which institutional structure is best suited to governmental
provision of transition relief. The key to our solution is the disaggregation of transition relief into various steps and the allocation of individual duties based on institutional competency. Specifically, we argue
that there are many circumstances in which we might appropriately
leave the general decision whether to allow for any transition relief to
the legislature, while an independent agency might best make decisions as to the form of transition relief and its allocation among competing claimants. This solution maintains legislative input on questions
related to legitimacy and fairness while diminishing the opportunity of
some actors to seek rents via political lobbying. 9
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of
the existing literature. It discusses the prior general law and economics proscription against legal transition relief and then canvasses
8 See, e.g., Nash & Revesz, supra note 2, at 1727-28 (advocating limiting transition
relief to actors who invest in advanced control technology ahead of legal requirements).
9 We note at the outset that we are not concerned here with every conceivable type of
regulation that a legislature or agency might implement. Our focus is on economic regulations of all types-environmental protections, workplace safety laws, food quality regulations, etc. We place to the side all strictly "social" regulation, such as rules regarding
marr iage or abortion. Issues stemming from California's recent prohibition on same-sex
marriage after its prior legalization, for instance, are beyond the scope of this Article.
While we recognize that the line between these two categories may not be entirely clean or
precise, we will generally focus on only those types of regulations that money alone can
compensate.
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various commentators' justifications for limited legal transition relief.
We hasten to note that in describing the potential welfare benefits of
transition relief we rely entirely on this prior work. We premise our
argument on the notion that in certain circumstances transition relief
can be beneficial, and we do not intend to reargue that point here.
Part 11 examines the absence of a private market in insurance against
the risks of legal transitions and finds pricing to be the largest impediment. Part III analyzes whether information and derivatives markets
could aid in solving these pricing problems, and it concludes that such
markets are unlikely to be of sufficient help. Finally, having concluded
that no private market for regulatory insurance is likely to develop,
we turn our attention in Part IV to the question of which institutions
might be best situated to decide whether and how to issue transition
relief. We argue that an independent agency should play a larger role
in providing transition relief. In particular, such an agency should have
a say as to the form of transition relief and should generally handle its
allocation.
I
THE TRADITIONAL LAW AND ECONOMICS VIEW OF
LEGAL TRANSITION RELIEF

In this Part, we present the existing law and economics literature
on relief from legal transitions. First, we describe the general proscription against such relief as expounded by Louis Kaplow. Second, we
discuss the growing recognition that transition relief can be socially
beneficial in particular circumstances. Third, we survey the basic arguments for and against private and public providers of transition relief.
We wish to emphasize that we intend to break no new ground in
describing the arguments favoring transition relief in limited circumstances. We rely entirely on the arguments that exist in the literature,
which we find largely persuasive.
A.

The Standard Treatment of Transition Relief

The seminal treatment of transition relief is Louis Kaplow's 1986
article on the subject.' 0 In that article, Kaplow argued that relief from
legal transitions was essentially never justified on a welfare basis. He
grounded his argument on an analogy between legal regime changes
and other types of changes that actors in society may face, such as
10 Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 5.
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economic and technological transitions and changes to health status.'"
The government does not ordinarily provide relief to actors that suffer
as a result of economic or technological change and, Kaplow argued,
the government should treat legal regime transitions no differently
from economic and technological changes.' 2
Indeed, classical law and economics approaches imply that transition relief can be socially unproductive. The absence of governmentprovided relief encourages societal actors to act efficiently and to plan
in anticipation of possible economic and technological changes. 13
Were the government to provide legal regime transition relief, societal
actors might be discouraged from anticipating looming changes in the
law. Because efficiency considerations suggest that the law should
encourage societal actors to anticipate such changes, Kaplow concluded that legal regime transition relief is generally normatively
undesirable.' 4
At the outset, it is important to note that Kaplow's argument
depends to some extent on the availability of private insurance for
legal transitions.' 5 One way that societal actors can anticipate and
guard against the risks of economic and social transitions is to
purchase insurance against those risks; Kaplow anticipates that societal actors should also be free to guard against the risks of legal transitions by purchasing insurance against those risks.' 6 Yet, on this score,
the analogy between social or economic changes and legal transitions
falls short: While as a general matter markets exist for private insur-

11 Id. at 533-36; see also DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC
RETROACTIVITY 27-32 (2000) (discussing incentive effects on societal actors of ex ante likely direction of rule changc).
12 E.g., Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 5, at 533-36.
13 Id. at 528-31.
14 Id. With respect to policy-based changes in the law, Daniel Shaviro argues that it
might be optimal both to compensate those who stand to lose under a new legal regime
and also to seek compensation from those who stand to gain. SHAVIRO, supra note 11, at
99-100. He recognizes, however, that the political reality is that those who stand to lose are
much more likely to obtain compensation than are those who stand to gain liely to be
compelled to surrender it. Id. at 100-01. Given this asymmetry, he concludes that the
better norm is to deny transition relief across the board. Id. at 101. For a discussion of
Shaviro's view with respect to non-policy-based legal changes, see infira note 42 and accompanying text.
15 See Kaplow, Transition Policy, supra note 1, at 178-86 (predicting greater efficiency
from private insurance scheme than from transition relief).
16 See, e.g., Kaplow, Legal Transitions,supra note 5, at 527-28 ("Insurance is one of the
more common techniques for mitigating risk ... )
AND POLMTCAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSMON RELIEF AND
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ance against economic downturns,' 7 similar markets do not exist for
private insurance against legal transitions."'
This dissimilarity poses a significant puzzle: Why have private
insurance markets for legal transitions failed to arise? We take up this
question, as well as the subsidiary issue of whether government might
be able to foster the growth of such a market, 19 in Part 11. In addition,
the absence of private insurance provides a first justification for some
type of government-supplied transition relief. The fact that private
insurance is often available as a hedge against economic change, but
not against legal change, suggests that government-provided transition
relief should, if anything, be more common in the setting of legal
transitions. 20
B.

Carveouts to the General Proscription: The Argument
for Transition Relief

The absence of private insurance aside, a number of commentators working within the basic logic of Kaplow's argument have
advanced theories of limited situations in which legal transition relief
might be justified. We group these arguments into five broad categories: (1) concerns of efficiency; (2) promotion of socially productive
investment; (3) political necessity; (4) enhancement of governmental
legitimacy; and (5) concerns of fairness. We canvass these in turn.
First, transition relief may be necessary to further efficiency.
Steven Shavell has explained broadly that there are circumstances
where the social costs of the absence of transition relief outweigh the
social costs of transition relief itself.2 ' Where investments for compliance are durable, the costs that a firm faces to comply with a new legal
rule immediately upon its enactment-by, for example, retrofitting its
factory-may far outweigh the marginal benefit gained. 22 Shavell also
17 In addition to private insurance, some actors are able to hedge against future economic change using futures contracts. See, e.g., Eric J. Pan, Single Stock Futures and Crossborder Access for U.S. Investors, 14 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 221, 239 (2008) ("Futures contracts are used to lock in the price of assets in the future to protect the investor from
adverse changes in the spot market price of the asset.").
18 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 7, at 592-97 (explaining absence of private insurance markets against legal change).
19 See Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 5, at 545 n.99 (noting possibility of government support of private insurance).
20 This is not to suggest that, normatively, the absence of an insurance market should
mandate transition relief. We mean only to suggest that the analogy between the settings is
not so clear, and also that, as a positive matter, transition relief might be more common
than government mitigation of natural social and economic change given the absence of a
private insurance market for regulatory change.
21 Shavell, supra note 7, at 38.
22 Id. at 38-39.

Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law

May 2010]

INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF TRANSITION RELIEF39

399

argues that the costs of administering transition relief may justify
delaying legal transitions: Where legal change is inefficient without
transition relief, and where the costs of distinguishing between those
who should enjoy relief and those who should not outweigh the benefits of offering any relief at all, the change should be delayed until it

becomes efficient with no transition relief.2 3

Second, policymnakers may harness transition relief to encourage
socially productive investment. There are several ways that this investment may manifest itself. We have each separately advanced arguments along these lines 24 as have Kyle Logue 2 5 and Lawrence Blume
and Daniel Rubinfeld. 2 6
Masur has explained that the availability of transition relief may
.induce actors to undertake voluntary projects. Consider that some
societal actors may decide whether to undertake a project or investment depending upon whether they can expect the government to
stand by the current legal regime. 2 7 On this basis, avenues should be
available for government agencies to commit to the status quo on at
least a limited basis.2 8 The decision to do this should lie with the relevant government agency; presumably, an agency would opt to commit
only to the extent that the societal benefits of such commitment outweighed its costs.
Nash and Richard Revesz have explained that efficiency may justify grandfathering existing investments for some reasonable time
period in compliance with an old environmental legal regime:
One might argue that the incentive to anticipate legal change can be
excessive in some cases. For example, an actor who foresees a
change in technology and installs that technology might find that
technology was about to advance again. Depending upon the cost of
replacing old equipment with new and the rate at which technology
is advancing, plant owners might rationally decide that it is too
Id. at 39.
See Masur, supra note 7, at 1041-47 (arguing that vulnerability to legal transitions
may discourage investment); Nash & Revesz, supra note 2, at 1727-28 (noting that limited
transition relief might be justified on grounds of investment efficiency).
25 See Logue, supra note 7, at 1138-43 (arguing that without transition relief, tax incentives may become more expensive to government).
26 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 7, at 582-99 (contending that absence of private
insurance against government action may necessitate compensation for government takings in order to minimize suboptimally low investments).
27 Masur, supra note 7, at 1041-47.
28 Id. at 1025; see also Christopher Serkin, Entrenching Environmentalism:Private C'onservation Easements over Public Land, U. CHI. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://ssmn.com/abstract=1474288 (arguing that legislative entrenchment of preexisting private law might be proper in some circumstances, but only if appropriately limited).
23

24
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costly to comply with all technological changes, even ones that they
anticipate.
To remedy this situation, grandfathering may be desirable
where precautionary investments are "durable" for some period of
time, and especially where the cost of including pollution control
technology in new plants is far less than the cost of installing such
technology in existing plants. 29
Along similar lines, the large expenses generally associated with
environmental regulatory compliance might discourage actors from
voluntarily complying with impending regulation absent some assurance that a subsequent tightening of the regulatory standard would
not soon render that investment obsolete. Once again, transition relief
would be normatively desirable to the extent that it fostered the sizeable investments necessary to comply with existing legal regulation.
Thus, for example, time-limited transition relief might be necessary in
some situations to encourage welfare-enhancing investments. 3 0
Logue has argued that transition relief may protect the law's
ability to influence behavior. For example, Congress has at times
attempted to alter taxpayers' behavior using the tax code.3 1 For such
so-called "incentive subsidies" to be effective, either taxpayers must
be able to rely on the government's commitment to retain those incentives or the government must offer greater subsidies to produce the
same effect. 3 2 Blume and Rubinfeld focus on compensation for takings 33 as an example of transition relief that encourages owners to
undertake investments with respect to their property. They explain
that the absence of private insurance against government action may
necessitate compensation for government takings in order to minimize
suboptimal investments. 3 4
A third justification for transition relief may stem from political
necessity. Under Saul Levmnore's reasoning, Kaplow's description of
the nature of legal regime change paints a false choice. 35 Kaplow
assumes that there can be a state of the world under a new legal
regime without transition relief-call this state of the world N-and
that state N is preferable to the status quo (state S). But it may be that
state N is not attainable: Those who stand to lose in the transition
29 Nash & Revesz, supra note 2, at 1727-28 (footnotes omitted).
30 Id.; cf. Masur, supra note 7, at 1043 (noting that actors may avoid investments in

absence of commitment to regulatory stability).
31 Logue, supra note 7, at 1138-39.
32 Id. at 1139.
33 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting taking of private property "for
public use, without just compensation").
34 Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 7, at 582-99.
35 Levmnore, supra note 7, at 1665-66.
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from S to N may have enough political power to block that transition.
They may demand and extract transition relief in exchange for
allowing the new legal regime to be enacted. If that is true, then state
N may not be a viable, attainable choice. Even if state N would be
preferable to a state of the world where the new legal regime obtains
but transition relief has been granted (call this state N') the actual
choice lies not between state S and state N, but rather between state S
and state N'. If that is so, transition relief is normatively desirable so
long as state N' is preferable to state S because transition relief will
facilitate the attainment of this new legal regime. Without transition
relief, the status quo S will remain entrenched. 3 6
Fourth, as Nash has explained elsewhere, the goal of maintaining

governmental legitimacy may justify transition

relief.37

The absence of

transition relief may generate externalities and impose costs on parties
not directly affected by the transition. 3 8 Social norms may also dictate

some transition relief.3 9
Fairness concerns provide a fifth and final possible justification
for transition relief:
[Olne can argue that it is unfair to require actors who have invested
in an upgrade before a new regulation takes effect to once again
undertake costly compliance with a new standard. Thus, like considerations involving incentive effects, concerns of fairness may justify
extending protection to societal actors who invest before a regulation takes effect for some reasonable period of time. 4 0
It may also be unfair to deny transition relief to a party that truly
could not have anticipated the legal change. Logue notes that not all
of the arguments for withholding transition relief from corporations
apply with respect to individuals, implying that unsophisticated parties
should receive relief more regularly than sophisticated ones. 4 1 Daniel
Shaviro makes a similar argument about non-policy-based legal
changes, such as changes to the accounting rules under the tax laws.
Insofar as these types of changes have less valence, they are more in
the nature of housekeeping and much less predictable. Accordingly,
36

Id.

37 Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty, supra

note 7, at 831, 833-34.

Id. at 834 (suggesting that avoidance of externalities justified government relief to
financial sector in recent economic crisis).
39 Id. (arguing that transition relief may be justified "to protect lifestyles and community cohesion").
40 Nash & Revesz, supra note 2, at 1730-31 (footnote omitted).
41 See Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Legal Progress, 13
J. CoNTEmp. LEGAL ISSUEs 211, 213 (2003) (noting that "competitive, evolutionary pressures" that make corporations likely to anticipate risks do not apply to individuals).
38
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we should be more likely to afford transition relief with respect to
them. 42
These justifications for transition relief fall into three general categories: justifications based on the notion that transition relief is economically beneficial on its own merits (rationales 1 and 2); a
justification based on the idea that the new, superior legal regime is
unattainable without the provision of transition relief (rationale 3);
and justifications based on fairness or legitimacy (rationales 4 and 5).
For ease of explication we will refer to the first category as the "economic" rationales for transition relief, the second category as the
"6political" rationale, and the third category as the "legitimacy" rationales. The distinctions among these three categories will be significant
to the analysis in Part IV.
We believe that these scholars have successfully established the
desirability of transition relief, at least in particular circumstances. For
the balance of this Article, we put aside the question of whether transition relief is ever justified, treating it as a premise of our inquiry.
That is not to say, of course, that it should become the norm in legal
regime shifts. Transition relief will, we hope, remain quite rare. The
question that remains is. who should provide that relief when it is
warranted.
C

Private and Public Provision of Transition Relief

The commentators who argue for government-provided legal
transition relief generally assume that private insurance will not be

available to fill the gap left in the absence of such

relief.4 3

Were pri-

vate insurance available, it might help to address many of the identified problems. A market for private insurance against legal transitions
presumably would provide assurance for continued investments in the
face of legal uncertainty without actually requiring legal transition
relief.44 The availability of insurance might also ameliorate the polit42 SHAVIRO, supra note 11, at 101-03.

4~3See, e.g., Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 7, at 572 ("Although one might expect
investors to avoid the costs associated with risk by obtaining insurance in the private
market, such insurance is not available because of market failure.").
44 Investors might well prefer that publicly owned and traded companies operate neutrally with respect to risk. An investor can hedge risk on her own simply by assembling a
diverse portfolio of assets. In reality, of course, agency costs within firms often lead them
to behave in risk-averse fashion. Executives seeking to protect their jobs will avoid risky
behavior, even at the expense of lower expected net returns. See William W. Bratton, Jr.,
CorporateDebt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.. 92,
128 n.163 (describing management's risk aversion due to its "undiversifiable investment in
human capital"); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of
Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 864 (1984) (noting that market pressures are unlikely to
overcome top management's aversion to risk). This risk-averse behavior makes regulatory
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ical argument for legal transition relief: If the putative losers under a
new legal regime would have their losses covered by private insurance, those parties would have reduced incentives to obstruct the new
legal regime. 45 It might also mitigate fairness concerns. 46 The availability of private insurance, however, would not be a panacea. It would
only lessen the concerns described above, not eliminate them, because
the "recipients" of transition relief would be forced to pay for it to
some degree through insurance premiums. It would also do little to
cure inefficiencies related to transition costs (rationale 1) or shortfalls
in governmental legitimacy (rationale 5).
At the same time, private insurance seems quite attractive when
compared with the governmental alternative, at least on its face. A
private insurance market would likely be superior to the government
at assembling the information and processes necessary to arrive at the
optimal level of transition relief-that is, the level at which the mar-

ginal benefit of additional transition relief equals

its cost.47

To be sure,

a government actor may in many cases be better able to anticipate
what regulations the government is on the verge of issuing. This will
not always be true, however. Individual government actors may not be
aware of what other governmental actors want or plan. Profit may
also motivate private insurance companies to gather and aggregate
that information, even if it is not as immediately available to them.
Even if government actors are better positioned to know what
government regulations are impending, they are not as well positioned
to assess how those regulations might impact prospective regulated
(or other) insurance potentially socially valuable even for publicly traded firms with diversified owners, which other-wise might manage risk effectively on their own.
There may also be some risks small enough to allow large firms to self-insure (i.e.,
absorb the risk and count on the firm's large size to protect it against significant shocks).
However, for smaller firms most regulatory risks will be too large to permit self-insurance;
and some regulatory events-major carbon taxes, for instance-may be so significant that
even large firms cannot self-insure. There are thus many contexts in which self-interested
firm executives would pursuc outside insurance.
45 See Kaplow, Transition Policy, supra note 1, at 197-98 (noting that compensation for
preexisting interests may reduce or eliminate resistance of those who otherwise would
stand to lose under new legal regime and that "private insurance may also produce a similar effect").
46 If parties did not know in advance whether they would be winners or losers under a
new legal regime, they would all elect to insure, leaving them in similar positions once the
new regime was implemented. But see William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 17 J. LEGAL STrUD. 269, 282-83 (1988) (discussing how insurance against takings
would not cover demoralization costs-that is, negative feelings about government that
result from exercise of eminent domain).
4~7 Cf Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82 NoTRan DAMEr
L. Ray. 313, 340 (2006) (describing "optimal level of pollution" analogously).
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entities .481 In this regard, government lacks the information and incen-

tives to select the optimal level of

relief.4 9

Suboptimal choices in set-

ting the amount of relief-whether too little or too much-will lead to
distortions in behavior and ultimately to inefficient outcomes. In contrast, a private insurance market is designed to respond to price signals and thus is likely to arrive at close to that optimal level (although
it will not succeed when social benefits and costs differ from private

benefits and costs).5 0

Leaving aside informational shortcomings, a second problem of
government provision of transition relief involves the government's
likelihood of falling prey to those who seek transition relief and consequently meting out too much relief. Government is susceptible to
interest group pressure from potential recipients, and transition relief
will likely be valuable enough to spur societal actors to apply pressure.
Transition relief is a likely subject of lobbying: "The clearer it is who
the winners and losers will be, the more intense the lobbying and the
48 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits
in Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1413-15 (2008) (detailing information
deficits faced by government agencies in evaluating environmental regulatory decisions).
419 Cf. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1342-43 (1985) (arguing that implementation of marketable pollution
emission allowance scheme in place of environmental command-and-control regulation
"would immediately eliminate most of the information-processing tasks that are presently
overwhelming the federal and state bureaucracies" and "[ilnstead of giving the job of economic and technological assessment to bureaucrats, . . . would put the informationprocessing burden precisely where it belongs: upon business managers and engineers who
are in the best position to figure out how to cut back on their plants' pollution costs").
Some commentators laud the notion of Congress setting the level of pollution under a
cap-and-trade regime. See, e.g., id. at 1353 (noting regime's advantages over commandand-control policies); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 636
[hereinafter Sunstein, Administrative Substance] (observing that one benefit of cap-andtrade system as compared to command-and-control regulation is that cap-and-trade systems put political and public focus on how much pollution will be allowed); Cass R. Sunstein, Democratizing America Through Law, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 949, 967 (1991)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Democratizing America] (same). This argument is made, however, in
the context of "democratizing" the development of environmental law by focusing attention on an issue that the public can easily digest, not on the idea that in fact government is
by design more likely than a private market to arrive at an "optimal" level of pollution. See
Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances
and the "Polluter Pays" Principle,24 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 465, 525 n.224 (2000) (noting
possibility that democratically determined pollution cap might differ from optimal level of
pollution).
50 See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and
Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUm. L.
REV. 75, 106-07 (1993) (discussing differences between social insurance and private insurance in context of tort reform); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 277, 309 (2001) (describing how private insurance would not be
perfect substitute for takings liability because it does not cover demoralization costs suffered by society when government takes property).
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greater danger of legislation emerging that caters to the interests of
powerful incumbents."15 1 A captured governmental body will not generate transition relief that is socially desirable; rather, it will deliver
relief to the actors who have "captured" the agency.52 And even if the
government is not fully captured by special interests, it will still be
subject to lobbying by those interest groups.53
In addition, as Levmore notes, the possible advent of a new legal
regime offers a particularly powerful opportunity for special interest
groups with political power to threaten to block the enactment of the
new regime. 54 Those groups may agree to allow the new regime to

become law only upon securing transition

relief.5 5

Interest groups and

politicians on the other side who highly value enactment of the new
regime may be happy (under the circumstances) to make this trade. 56
In this sense, transition relief may be a goal often achievable through
capture, lobbying, and barter, rather than on the basis of pure social
welfare.
The weaknesses inherent in governmental provision of transition
relief make market-based alternatives attractive. Yet no private
market for transition relief has come into existence, and none is on the
horizon. In the Part that follows, we explore and explain this puzzling
lacuna.

51 Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 42 (2008).
52 For a review of capture theory, see Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1260, 1284-92 (2006).
53 See Bradford C. Mank, Superfuind Contractors and Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U.
ENvTL. LiJ. 34, 49 (1993) (arguing that "agency capture is a continuum" on which outside
influence may not rise to level of total capture). Moreover, the success of interest groups at
attaining transition relief at one stage may serve to fuel demands for additional transition
relief-including extensions of earlier relief-at later stages. As Nash and Revesz explain:
"Transition relief ... generally gives rise to . .. an incentive for existing actors to try to
preserve and extend transition relief so they can continue to extract the economic rents it
creates." Nash & Revesz, supra note 2, at 1729. Thus, lobbying begets transition relief,
which may in turn beget more lobbying later for even more (or extensions of) transition
relief.
54 Levmore, supra note 7, at 1665.
55 See, e.g., BRUCE A. AcKEi~iAN' & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COALIDIRTY AIR
44-54 (1981) (describing how polluting sources in eastern United States secured amendment of clean air legislation to limit ability of western states, where air was relatively
cleaner, to attract prospective competitors through promise of less stringent air quality
controls).
56 Levmore, supra note 7, at 1665-66.
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11
THE

PRIVATE MARKET'S FAILURE

Regulated firms now confront a challenging landscape. On the
one hand, there is a widely felt need for some type of transition relief,
a need buttressed by sound economic theory. At the same time,
government-provided relief-in the form of grandfathering-is widely
opposed on the grounds that government will do a poor job of
rationing the supply, both because of rent-seeking political activity
and because government cannot accurately assess the market. The
obvious remedy is a private market for regulatory insurance, and several commentators have suggested such a solution. 57 Yet no market
has ever developed, for reasons no one has been able to explain adequately. In this Part, we attempt an explanation for this glaring market
failure, and we propose a variety of measures that Congress might
take to facilitate the development of private regulatory insurance.
A.

The Need for Insurance

As the foregoing Part made clear, the possibility of state or federal regulation presents a set of business risks akin to the risk of loss
from a fire or flood. Businesses will rationally wish to guard against
many of these risks, and from the standpoint of overall social welfare,
it will make sense in a variety of cases to allow businesses some protection against the costs and uncertainty that these regulatory transitions might create. Government-provided grandfathering is the
traditional solution to such problems, but there are many reasonspolitical, market-related, and information-driven-to believe that
government is a particularly ineffective purveyor of such relief. 58
Indeed, it is unlikely that government will succeed in allocating
grandfathered relief in anything approaching an efficient manner.
Under these circumstances, the most evident solution would
appear to be a private market for regulatory insurance. Firms would
not be spared the costs of regulatory transitions, but they would be
able to amortize those costs and deflect the risk and uncertainty associated with changes in the regulatory landscape. Regulated firms
would then be able to make greater investments in new technologies
and new lines of business without fear of unpredictable legal developments wiping them out. This loosening of firm behavior would likely
57 Eg., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 50, at 307-10; Blume & Rubinfeld, supra
note 7, at 590-92; Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should "Just Cornpensation" Be Abolished, and Would "Takings Insurance" Work Instead?, 64 Omo ST. L.J.
451, 513-16 (2003); Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 5, at 537-41; Shavell, supra note
7, at 78.
58 See supra Part I.C.
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have salutary overall effects on social welfare. 59 it is not surprising,
then, that several commentators have suggested the value of a private
market for regulatory insurance and transition relief. Indeed, while
some have merely pointed to the obvious market need, 60 others
59 Our claim that a functioning market for private regulatory insurance would enhance
social welfare is based upon the arguments of numerous other scholars detailed in Part 1.
We do not intend to break any new ground on this question here. Nonetheless, we pause to
address briefly one commonly raised objection to transition relief, namely, that it will disincentivize firms from adapting to new rules in socially beneficial ways.
Were it to exist, private regulatory insurance would be unlikely to generate this unwelcome effect so long as insurance contracts were structured properly. As we describe below
in the subsection on moral hazard, these contracts should be written to provide fixed
payouts in the event of regulation, not unlimited liability based upon an insured's actual
losses. See infra Part II.B.1.a. Consider, for instance, thc effect of a carbon tax on the
American automobile industry. A carbon tax will make SUVs more expensive relative to
smaller, more fuel-efficient cars. Consumers will accordingly shift some consumption to
those smaller cars, and automotive companies will adjust production towards those types
of vehicles as well.
This shift will occur irrespective of whether the industry is insured against carbon regulation: So long as insurance contracts are written to provide fixed payments in the event
of regulation, insurance will not change firms' incentives at the margin. The firm will collect the fixed insurance payout regardless of what action it takes in response to the regulation. Thbe firm will then make the same competitive decision it would have made absent
insurance; it has no reason to adjust its behavior. Thus, the presence of insurance will not
significantly dissuade firms from anticipating legal change, which is sometimes required as
a matter of efficiency. See Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in
Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 65-66 (1977) (explaining that it is often efficiency enhancing when private parties anticipate legal change); Levmore, supra note 7, at
1663 (same).
Insurance might have some effect on industries' incentives to anticipate legal change.
But even this will be a second-order effect. Again, insurance would not disincentivize firms
from taking into consideration the possibility of future regulation at the margin; it would
only affect the risk profile of the various options available to the firm. Thus, even if regulation is endogenous to firm behavior--e.g., the more that automobile manufacturers switch
to fuel-efficient cars, the more likely it is that the government will impose a carbon taxthe availability of insurance would not significantly alter the probability of legal change.
The principal effects of insurance would be to cushion the industry against the costs of
switching production and possibly to disincentivize the industry from lobbying against regulatory change. See infra Part LI.B.1.b (describing effect of regulatory insurance on
industry lobbying). It is thus conceivable that the availability of insurance would have salutary effects on the rate of legal change. Cf. Levmore, supra note 7, at 1668-74 (describing
ways in which transition relief can encourage legal change by mitigating losses of losers in
new regime, but arguing such benefits are outweighed by risk of rent-seeking).
Automobile firms would be disincentivized from altering their behavior only if they
were insured based on actual lost profits. In this circumstance, insured firms would have
little or no incentive to mitigate the harm to their businesses caused by regulation-in fact,
they might as well shut down. This presents a typical case of moral hazard, a threat that we
believe can be dealt with by contract. We discuss the contractual solution to this problem
infra Part II.B.1.
60 See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 7, at 78; David A. Dana, Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy
Research, Retorming Section 10 and the Habitat Conservation Program 27 (Sept. 15,2009)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University Law Review), available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/Dana.pdf.
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appear to assume that such a market either already exists or will soon
*spring forth into being.6 '
Yet that has not taken place. There exists no meaningful market
for regulatory insurance in the United States, and not even a market
for insurance against government takings (which would appear to be a
much simpler endeavor). 62 This is not to say that there is an underdeveloped market for such insurance, or that firms are forced to pay
exorbitant rates and often have difficulty finding coverage; to the contrary, the market simply does not exist. Firms that wish to guard
against large governmental changes that affect their businesses must
either self-insure or invest in lobbying as a palliative; there are no
other options.
B.

Market Explanations for the Insurance Gap

Given the obvious demand for some type of regulatory insurance
to supplement (or displace) government-provided transition relief, the
complete absence of any market solution is puzzling. Scholars have
made various attempts to explain this gap in the market-though
mostly in the context of takings, and more rarely with respect to general administrative regulation-and they have pinned the blame on a
variety of the usual economic culprits. In this Section, we review these
possibilities and ultimately conclude that none of the typical explanations offers a plausible solution to this puzzle, at least when it comes
to health and safety regulations. Instead, we argue that the market's
failure to provide any type of private insurance is attributable to the
61 See, e.g., Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 5, at 537-41 (taking existence of
private market insurance for granted in discussing moral hazard problem).
62 It is noteworthy that a robust market exists for insurance against foreign government
expropriation of American firms' assets abroad. See Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The
Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA 's Investment Protectionsand the Misguided Quest for an
International "Regulatory Takings" Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 30, 111-14 (2003)
(describing market). Yet even this insurance covers only genuine seizure of property, not
standard regulation. The policies written by the two major providers are illustrative. The
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency insures only against
[a~ny legislative action or administrative action or omission attributable to the
host government which has the effect of depriving the holder of a guarantee of
his ownership or control of, or a substantial benefit from, his investment, with
the exception of non-discriminatorymeasures of general application which governments normally take for the purpose of regulating economic activity in their
territories.
Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency art. 11(a), Oct. 11,
1985, T.I.A.S. No. 12,089, 1508 U.N.T.S. 99 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) insures policyholders only against "total expropriation" in violation of international or local laws, not standard legal regulation. See Been &
Beauvais, supra, at 112-13 & n.383 (citing variety of OPIC documents and discussing possible limits of coverage, including regulatory expropriations).

Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law

May 2010]

INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF TRANSITION RELIEF

40
409

difficulty of pricing what are effectively one-off "democratic"
transactions.
1. Moral Hazard
Insurance against economic regulation poses two types of potential moral hazard problems. First, an insured firm might engage in
"internal" activities that heighten its exposure to risk. A firm might
fail to develop new product lines or ways of doing business as hedges
against changes in the regulatory environment-the equivalent of
failing to take useful precautions-or it might recklessly expand its
business in such a way as to heighten damages in the event of a regulatory change. Second, the firm might engage in "external" activitiesnamely, lobbying-that heighten the likelihood of regulation. We consider these possibilities in turn.
a. Internal Activities
Much like an individual with full medical coverage who chooses
to engage in risky and dangerous activities without adequate precautions, a firm that has procured insurance against a particular type of
regulatory risk might ignore possible mechanisms for diminishing its
exposure. For instance, a firm whose business relies on a particular
hazardous chemical might fail to explore alternatives if it has insured
against the risk of the government banning that chemical. These types
of moral hazards have typically shouldered the blame for the failures
of a variety of insurance markets, including insurance against takings
and regulation. 63
Yet the potential moral hazard in regulatory settings is not so
easy to pinpoint. Moral hazard problems exist when an insured party
engages in behavior-particularly as a consequence of purchasing
insurance-that the insurer has not priced into the contract.64 The
63 See, e.g., Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 7, at 593-95 (discussing complete lack of
competitive insurance markets for regulatory and physical takings); Calandrillo, supra note
57, at 513-14 (arguing that subjective valuations of real property by owners pose problems
for market value-based compensation); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Unbundling Risk
34-36 (Jan. 31, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University Law
Review) (blaming failure of markets to emerge in part on inability to separate insurable
risks from those under individual's control); cf. Robert G. Chambers, Insurability and
Moral Hazard in Agricultural Insurance Markets, 71 Amv.J. AGnic. EcoN. 604, 604 (1989)
(noting that moral hazard is one of foremost obstacles to establishing private agricultural
insurance markets).
64 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,
53 Am. ECON. REV. 941, 961 (1963) (examining moral hazard as limitation on insurance).
See generally Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 Am. ECON.
REV. 531 (1968) (applying economic analysis to moral hazard in medical insurance); Steven
Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541 (1979) (discussing partial
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extreme skier who buys specially targeted health insurance is already
paying an additional premium for the increased risk that attends his
sport; there is no moral hazard. It is the mild-mannered law professor
who decides to take up extreme skiing because of his newly-purchased
gold-plated insurance who exploits a moral hazard. Similarly, in the
case of a home insurance policy against fire damage, the moral hazard
arises from the fact that the policy includes provisions requiring the
homeowner to install fire alarms, avoid space heaters, and so forth. 65
If the policy is priced to reflect the assumption that the homeowner
will take these steps, and if it is costly for the insurance company to
monitor whether the homeowner has complied (either before the fact
or after an accident has occurred), there is a substantial threat that the
66
homeowner will fail to take the necessary precautions.
But what are the assumptions built into the pricing of regulatory
insurance? Coverage must be based upon a firm's current business
rather than hypothetical developments and new product lines. Any
other approach would be too speculative because neither the insurance company nor the firm can predict whether new research and
development will bear fruit. Thus, it would be crucial for insurers to
write contracts that provided fixed payouts to insured parties in the
event of regulatory action (i.e., a promise to pay $10 million in the
event that Congress enacts a carbon tax). This sort of fixed-payment
insurance contract-unlike one that protected a firm against its full
losses without specifying those losses in the contract in advancewould protect the insurer against threats of moral hazard.67
Moreover, this type of pricing would leave in place the firm's
incentives to act efficiently. Purchasers of home fire insurance have
the ability to take effective precautions (such as installing smoke
alarms) and naturally demand insurance contracts that are priced
lower to reflect these precautions; 68 the moral hazard problem arises
because of the cost of monitoring. Here, there is no need to create
contracts based on speculative business developments. The regulated
solutions to moral hazards). For a broader treatment of the topic, see generally Tom Baker,
On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REv. 237 (1996).
65 See Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 5, at 538 & n.79 (explaining interaction of
moral hazard and efficient precautions); Chunchi Wu & Peter F. Colwell, Moral Hazard
and Moral Imperative, 55 J. RiSK & INS. 101, 112-15 (1988) (same).
66 See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 74
(1979) (noting role of asymmetric information in causing moral hazard problems due to
one contracting party's inability to observe perfectly other party's behavior).
67 See supra note 59 and sources cited therein.
68 Social costs are minimized when both parties take all efficient precautions. Robert
Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. Rev. 1,
6 (1985).
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firm can simply insure based on its current operations, which are not
costly to verify. 69 If a line of research presents the opportunity for an
efficient precaution-by ameliorating a firm's regulatory risk exposure-the firm has appropriate incentives to undertake that line of
research: If it switches to a less hazardous (and less likely to be regulated) chemical, it can negotiate less extensive coverage along with
lower premiums, allowing the firm to realize the benefits from its less
risky behavior. 70 In this sense, the firm is insured only against external
regulatory risk, not against the "business" risk presented by failed
development projects or inadequate research investment.
Nor would regulatory insurance likely spur any excess investment
in firm activities. If a firm knows that it will be compensated fully for
losses in the event of regulation-through the Takings Clause, for
instance, or via grandfathering-it has every incentive to make further
investments that might soon be destroyed (in the case of a taking) or
are inefficient when compared with alternatives (in the case of
grandfathering). 7 1 Regulatory insurance, by contrast, can be priced to
deal with these possibilities. Standard insurance contracts have cov-

erage limits and are priced according to those

limits;72

if a firm wishes

to expand a line of business and insure itself against the risk, the
insurer will force it to disclose this expansion and pay correspondingly
higher premiums. 73 So long as the insurer can observe actual, relevant
firm behavior, and so long as insurance contracts remain renegotiable
to reflect changed circumstances-both reasonable assumptions-this
type of regulatory insurance should not generate any significant moral
hazard.

69 An insurer could employ the same mechanisms that the EPA might use to verify a
firm's production or use of a particular chemical and, in many situations, could simply
piggyback off of already existing permitting and disclosure requirements. The additional
advantage of these verification efforts is that, in many instances, fraudulent disclosures
would be penalized civilly or criminally by state or federal authorities rather than as mere
instances of contract breach.
70 For a discussion of the use of feature ratings in assessing insurance premiums, see
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTIN'G RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC

POLICY 79-82 (1986).
71 See Calandrillo, supra note 57, at 493-95 (discussing excess incentives to invest in
improvements under system of government compensation).
72 See Benjamin J. Richardson, Mandating Environmental Liability Insurance, 12 DUKE
ENvrL. L. & POL'Y F. 293, 295-96 (2002) (describing structure of conventional insurance
contracts).
73 See Michael Spence & Richard Zeckhauser, Insurance, Information, and Individual
Action, 61 Am. ECON. REv. 380, 383 (1971) (analyzing manner in which insurers write
typical contracts); see also Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 5, at 538-40 (same).
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b. External Activities
In contrast to other typical forms of insurance, the triggering
events for regulatory insurance-legislation or agency action-are
entirely deliberate and fully "man-made." As a consequence, insurance against regulatory risk would seem particularly subject to moral
hazard because the events in question are especially susceptible to
human influence. 74 That is, an insurance company may become concerned that an insured firm will not take efficient steps to prevent-or
might even hasten-regulatory action against which the firm is
insured. 75
Consider the following basic model involving three actors: a regulatory agency, a regulated firm, and an insurer. Absent insurance, the
firm will lobby the agency in an attempt to forestall or avoid regulation where it believes that the costs of lobbying are less than the
expected benefits of avoiding regulation (discounted by the
probability that regulation will occur nonetheless). If the firm is able
to insure, however, it no longer bears the risk of regulation and so no
longer has any incentive to lobby. If the firm is obligated to lobby
(such as by contract), or even if it is asked to take a position on regulation, the firm will shirk if its effort level is costly to monitor. Moreover, under certain circumstances, the firm might even lobby in favor
of stricter regulation. In particular, if the firm is fully insured (and
therefore indifferent between regulation and no regulation) but
believes that its competitors are not as well insured (and are consequently more vulnerable to regulatory change), the firm might rationally invest in lobbying efforts against its own ostensible interest.
Insurers, however, should be able to cure these moral hazard
problems through contract. The parties simply could write regulatory
insurance contracts to ban any lobbying activities by insured firms
(and to force them to take no public position on relevant regulatory
action). And it should not be difficult for insurers to monitor this type
74 Of course, arson and theft for hire similarly involve human-catalyzed insurable risks.
But these are rare, illegal activities deterred by the criminal justice system, and so they do
not raise the same concerns as the possibility of legal individual action to influence the
likelihood of the occurrence of a covered event.
75 A similar concern motivated the traditional notion that an insurance firm will provide coverage only against events that arise from pure "fortuity." See ERIC MILLS HOLMES
& MARK S. RHODES, HOLMES's APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 1.4(A) (Eric Mills Holmes
ed., 2d ed. 1996) (describing fortuity and exclusion of intentional conduct from coverage);
BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ONqINSUR.ANCE COVERAGE
DISPTES § 8.02. at 561 (14th ed. 2008) ("Thus, by definition, insurance is not available for
losses that the policyholder knows of, planned, intended, or is aware are substantially certain to occur."); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONT-RrACTS § 1.06(A)(1)
(3d ed. Supp. 2010) (to same effect).
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of activity. Lobbyists must register federally and list their clients; 76
holders of public office (and candidates) must disclose campaign contributions; 77 and the Freedom of Information Act, 78 along with the
Administrative Procedure Act, 79 can be used to force most private
efforts to influence public policy into the open. 80 Certainly the possibility of secret, closed-door meetings between legislators and executives of regulated companies always remains, but this type of covert
activity is far less common and far less likely to be effective without
the backing of actual monetary support. Because federal laws have
forced lobbying to become such a public activity, third parties such as
insurers should have less difficulty monitoring it than they would have
overseeing the private behavior involved in most typical insurance.
One remaining question is whether a contract that bans insured
firms from lobbying would preclude some efficient solutions that the
parties would otherwise prefer. For instance, lobbying by a regulated
firm might be an efficient "precaution" against further regulation,
akin to installing a smoke alarm to guard against fire. If there are
gains from allowing firms to lobby, firms will demand the opportunity
to purchase lower-priced insurance contracts predicated on their
doing so. Once the parties write these contracts, the moral hazard
problem returns with full force: While an insurer can monitor relatively easily whether a firm engages in any quantity of lobbying
greater than zero (as described above), it will be very costly for the
insurer to monitor the precise quantity and quality of that lobbying. A
firm could hire cheaper and less effective lobbyists; it could trade a
willingness to accept regulation against which it is insured for the
blocking of another type of regulation for which it has no insurance;
and so forth. Information regarding the precise details of a firm's lobbying efforts-details which easily can have a large influence on the
8
success of those efforts-is costly for an outside insurer to access. '
2
2
78 5
79 5
76
77

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§§ 1603-1604 (2006).
§ 434(a)-(c) (2006).

§ 552 (2006).
§§ 551-559 (2006).
80 See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporatingthe Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. Ray. 1, 125 (1998) ("[G]ood-government supplements to the APA ...
make participation easier by facilitating agency monitoring . .. . (Tlhese acts owe their
origin in part to efforts to render administrative government more open by lowering the
costs of monitoring agency deliberations." (footnotes and internal quotation marks
omitted)). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational
Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. Rayv. 613, 614 (1998) (describing use of federal
statutes to reveal information on public deliberations and lobbying).
81 Indeed, monitoring even the most basic details of a firm's lobbying efforts would
appear to be a substantial undertaking. The sheer volume of issues that large firms spend
resources on can be astounding. For example, a study conducted after the passage of the
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Any insurance contract that specifies a nonzero level of lobbying will
thus be difficult to monitor and subject to possible shirking and moral
hazard.
There is, however, no reason to believe that there are efficiency
gains from allowing regulated firms to lobby. After all, typical industrial firms have no particular expertise in lobbying-they are experts
at producing whatever good or service they offer in the marketplace.
For this reason, and in part because lobbying is itself a regulated
activity, firms are unlikely to do their own lobbying. Instead, they
more commonly hire professional lobbying firms to advocate for
them. 82 There is no particular reason why regulated firms should be
the ones to do that hiring; if lobbying is an "efficient precaution,"
insurers can just as easily be the ones to purchase lobbying services.
There might even be economies of scale if insurers are able to write
multiple related insurance contracts and hire single lobbyists to advocate for or against regulations that affect each member within the
group. 83 These types of bundled, insured regulatory interests might
serve as efficient solutions to the collective action problems surrounding lobbying: The grouping of related firms under the auspices
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified as amended at
2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1612 (2006)). found that during the six-month period between July and
December 1996, General Motors filed 47 reports with the government detailing 157 issues
on which they had lobbied and spent over $15 million. Frank R. Baumgartner & Beth L.
Leech, Studying Interest Groups Using Lobbying Disclosure Reports, 18 Vox Pop NEwsL.
POL. ORGS. & PARTIES (Ray C. Bliss Inst. of Applied Politics, Univ. of Akron, Akron,
Ohio), Summer 1999, at 1, 2, available at http://www.uakron.edu/bliss/docs/Vol-18_Iss_1.
pdf. Furthermore, the lobbyists engaged by interest groups will often have the discretion to
choose both the forms that their lobbying efforts will take and the intensity of those efforts.
For a discussion of the flexible approach lobbyists apply to issue advocacy, see generally
Thomas T. Holyoke, Choosing Battlegrounds: Interest Group Lobbying Across Multiple
Venues, 56 POL. RES. Q. 325 (2003). Lastly, it is difficult to imagine how a firm could
accurately report the total quantity and effectiveness of its informal or grassroots lobbying
efforts. See generally KENNETH M. GOLDSTFEIN, INTEREST GRoues, LOBBYING, AND PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA (1999) (providing broad-ranging analysis of lobbying in United
States). Given the range of activities in which firms engage, difficult determinations might
have to be made about whether ostensibly nonpolitical activities have some influence on
political access. For example, should charitable donations be monitored as part of a firm's
lobbying effort? See Craig Smith, The New Corporate Philanthropy,72 HARv. Bus. REV.,
May-June 1994, at 105, 109-10 (describing use of charitable donations as form of
lobbying).
82 See Frank R. Baumgartner & Beth L. Leech, Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons:
Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics, 63 J. PoL. 1191, 1195 tbl.1
(2001) (finding that among businesses that participated in substantial lobbying activity,
73% utilized professional lobbying firms and only 27% engaged in their own lobbying
activities).
83 This practice might of course create other problems of correlated risk, which we
address infra Part II.B.3. But if insurers are diversified adequately, it should be possible for
them to obtain economies of scale without subjecting themselves to undue threats.
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of one insurer would lower the costs of negotiating a cooperative lobbying agreement. In this fashion, insurers might even form efficient
substitutes for large trade associations (which often function primarily
as lobbying groups).84
In a competitive market for regulatory insurance, insurers will
have an incentive to seek out efficient lobbying precautions in order
to compete along the dimension of price. It is difficult to know
whether the absolute amount of lobbying will decrease or increase,
and because lobbying often (but not always) involves rent-seeking
that diminishes social welfare 85 a more efficient system of lobbying
may not diminish the social harm caused by lobbying on the whole.
The amount of money spent on lobbying may well decrease, however,
and a decline in these deadweight expenditures almost certainly would
be socially beneficial.
Finally, it is worth noting that a private market for regulatory
insurance could collapse if the fact that a firm had purchased insurance caused the government to regulate that firm more aggressively
on the theory that the regulation would not substantially harm the
firm. If insurance itself caused regulation, the price of insurance would
rise dramatically, likely to the point at which it was no longer economically worthwhile for the firm. We do not believe that this pattern will
develop for two reasons. First, insurance agreements are private contracts between insurer and insured; the government may have no
means of discovering which parties actually have obtained insurance.
Second, insurance companies themselves will have an incentive to
lobby against regulation that will harm them financially. As we note
here, it is difficult to know whether the overall amount of lobbying
would increase or decrease in a regime of significant regulatory insurance. Regardless, the fact of insurance lobbying will erase the notion
84 See Baumgartner & Leech, supra note 82, at 1194-98 (showing that businesses and
trade associations account tor vast majority of lobbying expenditures); see also Ron
Chepesiuk, The Environmental Lobbying Game: Who Plays It on Capitol Hill and How,
102 ENvTh. HEALTH PERSP. 640, 640-42 (1994) (discussing lobbying efforts of trade
associations in area of environmental regulation). We hasten to add that we take no position on whether lobbying is socially beneficial or harmful, or what amount of lobbying is
optimal. We mean only to argue that large-scale regulatory insurance would not likely
affect the overall quantity of lobbying. The most significant change would simply be a
substitution away from trade associations and other interest groups and toward insurance
companies.
85 E.g., Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking State, 64 Am.
ECON. REV. 291, 295 (1974) (arguing that rent-seeking often leads to welfare losses); see
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3,
4-6 (1971) (arguing that demand from industry groups shapes form of regulations); cf
Michael Lusztig, The Limits of Rent Seeking: Why Protectionists Become Free Traders, 5
REV. INT'L Pot.. ECON. 38 (1998) (arguing that governments can turn rent-seekers into
proponents of free trade by convincing them that rents are unavailable).
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that regulatory action against insured parties is a "free lunch" for legislators and regulators. If regulation of insured firms becomes more
common, the increase in regulatory activity likely will be commensurate with (and driven by) the welfare gains to be had from regulatory
insurance in the first instance. There is thus no reason that the threat
of moral hazard should derail the development of a robust market for
regulatory insurance.
2.

Adverse Selection

Adverse selection problems occur when systems of insurance
become more attractive to riskier firms and individuals, leading them
to enroll in disproportionate numbers and impose unaccounted costs
on insurers. 86 Consider, for instance, an optional health insurance program offered at fixed cost to all employees of a particular firm. The
greater an individual's health risk, the more valuable the health insurance will be to that individual; and because the price of insurance is
fixed, the more likely that individual will be to enroll in the health
plan. This fixed-price plan will thus adversely select the most at-risk
employees, and the insurer's costs will rise. No matter how high the
insurer sets the premium, the plan will always attract employees with
the highest risks, and the insurer will be likely to lose money as a
result. 87
Several scholars have suggested that adverse selection problems
are likely to plague systems designed to insure against takings of real
property. 88 For instance, homeowners who know that they are more
likely to be subject to takings will opt into insurance plans at higher
rates. Like threats of moral hazard, however, adverse selection
problems depend at their core on information asymmetries. If all relevant information is public, insurers can price contracts accurately and
higher-risk private parties who wish to opt in will be able to do so only
at elevated rates. The fear in the takings context is that landowners
See Mark Pauly & Sean Nicholson, Adverse Consequences of Adverse Selection, 241J.
POL., POL'Y & L. 921, 922 (1999) (describing self-selection process creating
adverse selection problem); see also George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and
Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1540-42 (1987) (discussing systemic effects of
adverse selection); Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. EcoN. 629,636
(1976) (discussing equilibrium of market with imperfect information).
87 See Fennell, supra note 63, at 41-43 (describing manner in which adverse selection
problems can frustrate systems of insurance).
88 E.g., Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 7, at 595-96; Calandrillo, supra note 57, at
526-27; Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 46, at 286 ("An explanation for lack of private
taking insurance . .. is adverse selection. A public planner might tip off landowners of an
impending taking and encourage them to apply for insurance in order to reduce political
opposition to his project.").
86

HEALTH
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will have better information regarding the sorts of local projects that
might lead to eminent domain-new roads, rail lines, development
projects, and the like. 89 Local city councils and planning boards might
discuss these projects in forums-such as town meetings-that are
easily accessed by local residents but far more opaque to national and
international insurance companies. 90
These threats may be present in the context of takings of real
property, but they are unlikely to plague more general regulatory
insurance. The key to the adverse selection problem for takings insurance is that both the vast majority of the relevant governmental action
and the potential insured parties are local, while the principal insurers
are not. It is this geographic and political divide that gives rise to the
necessary informational asymmetries. The types of regulation that
concern us here, by contrast, are rarely local; they are almost always
created by state and federal governmental entities. As we have
already noted, there is negligible private information about these
types of regulation (except the information held by the government
actors themselves), and so regulated firms possess essentially no informational advantage over their putative insurers. 91 Without such an
asymmetry, there can be no problem of adverse selection.
3.

Uncorrelated Risks

Another potential hurdle to regulatory insurance lies in the difficulty of finding truly uncorrelated risks. Insurance companies exist
(and succeed) because they are able to diversify across a large portfolio of unconnected contracts that offer unrelated risks. 92 For
instance, house fires in Iowa and New York are entirely uncorrelated;
no single event will cause both, and there is no reason to believe that a
fire in one place will cause a fire in another. Accordingly, an insurance
firm can safely insure a house in Iowa and a house in New York (and,
to extrapolate, millions of other homes similarly scattered across the
country) without fear that one isolated event will force the firm to pay
benefits to millions of homeowners simultaneously.
89 See Calandrillo, supra note 57, at 526 (noting individuals with inside knowledge of
likely takings will buy insurance at disproportionate rates).
90 In contrast, adverse selection problems are far less likely with respect to takings of,
for instance, beachfront property. it is no secret whether a parcel of land includes beach
access, and this is precisely the type of information that insurers are likely to collect before
writing insurance contracts.
91 See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (describing public nature of lobbying
and regulation, which suggests that regulated firms have no greater access to relevant
information on regulators than insurers do).92 See Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 645, 648-53 (1985) (explaining economic advantages of ability to diversify risk).
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It is for this reason that insurance companies have been reluctant
to write policies insuring against terrorism, natural disasters, or other
large-scale calamities (often referred to as "catastrophe insurance"). 93
A single hurricane can destroy an enormous swath of housing along
the Florida coast or (nearly) the entire city of New Orleans, and only
an extremely large and well-diversified insurer could bear the risk of
insuring a substantial number of houses in a potential hurricane path.
Similarly, insurers fear that a major terrorist act-a nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack-could destroy or render uninhabitable a substantial swath of a major city, not to mention kill tens
of thousands of people .9 4 An insurer has only two options in the face
of such a large risk: refuse to insure more than a handful of people or
properties in any major city, or refuse to write individual policies that
cover acts of terrorism. By and large, insurers have chosen the latter.
Similar problems could conceivably be present in the market for
regulatory insurance. Regulation, particularly federal regulation, often
exceeds even natural disasters in scope, affecting hundreds of firms in
dozens of industries simultaneously, with economic impacts measured
in the billions of dollars.95 Even state-level regulation can have potent
and widespread effects, particularly if it comes from a populous,
93 See Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets,
and Uninsurable Risks, 64 J. RISK & INS. 205, 206 (1997) (noting that "catastrophe risks"
may be uninsurable if they are "too large"); see also Mario Miranda & Dmitry V. Vedenov,
Innovations in Agricultural and Natural Disaster Insurance, 83 Am. J. AGRic. ECON. 650
(2001) (discussing unwillingness of traditional insurance markets to cover agricultural
products in event of catastrophe and offering as solution possible securitization of these
risks); cf. Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty as a Basis for Standing, 33 HoFsTRA L. REV. 1123,
1129 (2005) ("[Tlhe president of the Reinsurance Association of America has reportedly
warned that global warming could bankrupt the insurance industry.").
94 See Ronald E. Ferguson, Chairman, General Re Corp., Statement on the Impact of
the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks on the U.S. Insurance and Reinsurance Industry
(Sept. 26, 2001), http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/092601fe.pdf (predicting that
U.S. insurance industry would be unable to sustain effects of multiple attacks on level of
those witnessed on September 11). However, the extent to which insurers will be liable in
the event of a future terrorist attack is still largely uncertain. See Michelle E. Boardman,
Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 790-98 (2005)
(explaining that, in spite of federal government's efforts to require coverage of terrorist
attacks by insurance companies, vast majority of policies still contain valid exclusions for
nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks, and arguing that terrorism in United States is
essentially uninsurable).
95 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFmcE, THE TOTAL COSTrS OF CLEANING up NONFEDERAL
SUPERFUND SITES 15-16 (1994), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4845/
EntireReport.pdf (estimating that continuing costs to private parties for Superfund
cleanups would exceed $43 billion). For a wide-ranging look at and critique of ex ante cost
assessments and the lack of retrospective empirical studies determining compliance costs
for various regulatory programs, see generally Thomas 0. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg,
Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997
(2002).
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highly industrialized state such as California or New York.96 The difficulty in assembling a portfolio of truly uncorrelated risk positions in
the face of such widespread single-event threats might be preventing a
robust market for regulatory insurance from forming.
We do not, however, believe that this is the case. There is a crucial distinction between regulatory insurance and catastrophe or terrorism insurance: Well-conceived regulatory insurance will cover only
one (or a finite number) of the potential business risks to a firm, while
catastrophe insurance effectively forces the insurer to assume the risk
of the destruction of the entire enterprise. For instance, any given firm
might use dozens of potentially regulated chemicals and employ
dozens of potentially regulated workplace practices, each of which
accounts for some small proportion of the firm's value. A potential
insurer could select which of these many available risks it is willing to
assume, knowing that any individual regulation would lead only to a
partial decrease in firm value-not the complete destruction of the
firm that might occur in the event of a hurricane. 97
In a competitive marketplace of multiple insurers, any given firm
should be able to find one or more insurers willing to take on any
given slice of risk. Imagine, for instance, a world in which there are N
potentially harmful chemicals (Chemicals 1, 2, 3, . . . N), and J potentially regulated employment practices (Practices 1, 2, 3,... J). A given
insurer might elect to write policies for some firms using Chemical 1 in
California, Iowa, and Georgia, some firms using Chemical 2 in New
York and Illinois, some firms employing Practice 5 in North Carolina
and Arizona, and so forth. With a sufficient number of insurers to
spread the total nationwide risk, firms should be able to purchase coverage for any risks that they wish to amortize. There are limits to this
principle if an insufficient number of insurers enter the marketplace;
for instance, the fiftieth firm using Chemical 2 in California might be
unable to acquire coverage if there are too few independent insurance
companies. 98 But at least some insurance, perhaps for less commonly
96 Regulations in a state such as California can affect businesses located elsewhere that
merely do business in California, forcing them to adjust their practices if they hope to
maintain their access to that valuable market. See John M. Broder, Obama Directs Regulators To Tighten Auto Standards, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
01127/us/politics/27calif.htm (describing effects of allowing states such as California and
New York to set higher automobile mileage standards).
97 This is the equivalent of a homeowner's insurance policy protecting only the furniture or the second bedroom against fire, rather than the entire house.
98 Suppose there are fifty California firms that use the same chemical and only two
regulatory insurers in the marketplace. Each insurer might be willing to write only twenty
contracts on the same regulatory risk within the same jurisdiction for fear of taking on too
much correlated risk. Under these circumstances, only forty of the firms would be able to
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used chemicals, should be available. A fear of correlated risks, therefore, cannot account for the complete absence of a market for regulatory insurance. 99
There is, however, one potential respect in which nationwide regulatory risks could be correlated: the case of a large political transition, a substantial transfer of power from one party to another within
one or more branches of government. 00 For instance, a new administration that assumes power with a commanding mandate and a set of
preferences that differs significantly from the status quo (or from the
prior administration) might undertake a sweeping set of regulations,
covering a swath of environmental and economic fields. Yet this outcome, while possible, is highly unlikely. No President regulates every
possible field of endeavor; the total number of regulations within any
four-year period, even if it appears large to the naked eye, represents
only a small fraction of the conceivable regulations that the government might create (and against which firms might have insured) .10 In
fact, there is not a great deal of variation in the total number of regulations among modern administrations; the most prolific regulators
were not significantly more active than the least.' 02 Even if there were
variation, however, insurers could simply write policies that expire
before a change in administration and reprice insurance contracts to
accord with new risks presented by an incoming party.
obtain coverage for regulatory risk related to that chemical, and ten firms would remain
uninsured.
99 It is worth noting that we do not think that the threat of correlated risks can account
fully for the absence of a catastrophe or terrorism insurance market, either. All of these
same options for managing risk are available to the firms that write such policies, and firms
need only limit the number of policies written in one geographic area if they wish to contain their overall risk exposure. Furthermore, financial services firms are adept at slicing
financial products and securities into tranches, each of which contains a small piece of a
large number of financial instruments. The resulting financial products can help distribute
risk and guard against all but the most widely spread national risks. Natural disasters are
essentially never national phenomena, and only the most serious conceivable terrorist
threat would have national reach-at which point paying insurance claims might no longer
be a relevant consideration. Instead, we think that the lack of a viable market for these
types of insurance products is attributable to the cause we describe infra Part II.BA4
100 We hasten to add that a transfer from Democratic to Republican control might be no
less threatening than a transfer in the opposite direction, despite the fact that Republicans
are conventionally thought to favor less regulation than Democrats. In many cases, firms
may wish to insure against deregulation; for instance, a firm that has developed a safe
alternative to CFCs and staked a sizeable investment in their continued regulation might
want to insure against deregulation of the ozone-depleting gas. The model we present here
is fully generalizable to any legislative or agency action, regardless of direction.
101 See Anne Joseph O'Connell, PoliticalCycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portraitof
the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 931 chart 1 (2008) (demonstrating
that federal bureaucracy as whole produces on order of 800-1000 regulations per year).
102 See id. (comparing George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush
administrations).
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We do not wish to overstate these conclusions; the threat of correlated regulatory risks is not trivial. But we do not believe that it can
explain the complete dearth of regulatory insurance. Rather, we
believe that the explanation lies with a difficulty more fundamental to
insurance markets, and one that is less easily surmounted.
4.

The Difficulties in Regulatory Pricing

Amidst all of the concern regarding moral hazard, adverse selection, and correlated risk problems in the market for regulatory insurance, scholars have almost entirely ignored the problem of pricing
such insurance. Pricing difficulties are, of course, not unique to regulatory insurance, and they can plague systematic efforts to buy and sell
probabilistic options of all types.' 03 Yet regulatory actions undertaken
by governments are fundamentally different from the types of events
that form the subject of most insurance products, and the problems
that they create are different in kind from those that exist in traditional insurance contexts.
As one might expect from a multi-trillion dollar industry, the
mechanics of pricing insurance are objective and actuarial. When
deciding whether to write a policy insuring a car, a home, or a person's
health, insurance companies consult complicated matrices of risk factors and results, assessing the risk involved in a particular project
based upon the rate of accidents that have befallen similarly situated
individuals. 10" Insurance companies know how much to charge a married, male, twenty-seven-year-old driver of a family sedan living in the
02143 zip code for automobile insurance because they have data on
the rate of accidents among drivers in that same demographic and
geographic stratum.' 05 Each driver or each homeowner is responsible
for a series of independent events that insurers can assemble and analyze. Moreover, accident data are usable and reliable because they are
103See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 942, 955-76 (1988) (laying blame for unavailability of environmental lia-

bility insurance in mid-1980s partly on inability of insurance firms to assess expected losses
due to high levels of legal uncertainty created by then-recent expansion of environmental
liability).
104 For a discussion of risk classification, see generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency
and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L. REV. 403 (1985), which attempts to
resolve the tension between the efficiency-promoting and risk-distributional features of
classification, and Keith J. Crocker & Arthur Snow, The Efficiency Effects of Categorical
Discrimination in the Insurance Industry, 94 J. POL. ECON. 321 (1986), which argues that
costless imperfect categorization, such as that based on age, sex, or race, always increases
efficiency.
105 See Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV.
517, 519-26 (1983) (explaining methodology employed by insurance companies to estimate
accident rates for classes of insured individuals).
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voluminous-milions of insured drivers drive tens of millions of miles
per day and file thousands of accident reports. An insurer need only
accumulate the necessary data and develop corresponding pricing
models. With sufficiently large data sets, individual variations will
wash out, and insurers will know approximately what they are bargaining for when they agree to insure a given individual-on average,
one married twenty-seven-year-old with a sedan behaves much like
another.
None of this is possible in the context of regulatory insurance for
a number of interconnected reasons. First, in comparison to typical
accidents, significant regulatory acts occur extremely infrequently,
usually numbering just below one thousand per year nationally. 106
Even this description overstates their quantity in the same way that a
reporting of all fires, floods, automobile accidents, and illnesses would
overstate the effective number of insurance claims (and thus the
number of useful data points) in a given year. Each federal agency
issues no more than a handful of regulations each year, and thus any
given regulatory field is altered only rarely.' 07 Without a broader pool
of data to draw upon, an insurance firm cannot reliably estimate the
hazards presented by any given regulation.
Second, unlike traffic accidents or house fires, regulatory acts are
effectively one-off, nonstochastic events. An individual fitting a given
demographic profile in 2005 is, for the most part, equally likely to
have an automobile accident as a similarly situated individual in
2006-what variation exists is captured by the easily obtainable demographic information that insurers collect. Accordingly, data from 2005
are useful in predicting 2006 outcomes, data from 2004 are useful in
predicting both 2005 and 2006, and so on. The likelihood of a particular regulation, on the other hand, depends upon a wide variety of
factors the impact of which is often unobservable or unpredictable. A
shift in agency leadership or political priorities, a transfer of govern106 O'Connell, supra note 101, at 931. We have not been able to locate reliable data, but
we suspect that states are somewhat less prolific, with dozens to hundreds of state regulatory acts per year.
107 The most prolific regulator, the Department of the Interior, averages approximately
100 regulations per year, with a high of 200. Id. at 939 chart 5. A variety of other federal
agencies, including the Department of Commerce, Department of Transportation, SEC,
FCC, and EPA average between 25 and 100 regulations per year. Id. In addition, many
agency regulations are not truly "regulatory" in the sense that private firms or other interested parties would understand the term. Many concern internal agency procedures or set
nonbinding guidelines and thus are unlikely to be the type of actions that firms would wish
to insure against. Presumably, a large percentage of the Department of the Interior's activities, which concern internal management of federal lands, fall into that category. Accordingly, the number of data points available to an insurer are likely substantially lower than
the rough estimates that we present as upper bounds.
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mental power, a change in membership or chairmanship on a key
committee, or even new developments in science or technology (or
culture) can affect the probability of any given regulation in any particular field in unforeseeable ways.' 08 In addition, the uncertainty and
variance in regulatory outcomes generated by single events can be tremendous. Publicity about evidence of a disappearing ozone layer may
have made regulation of CFCs vastly more likely;' 09 it is unlikely that
any single action would raise the rates of automobile accidents in the
same way."10
Worse still, regulation in one period is not necessarily a good
proxy for regulation in another period. The fact that the EPA regulated carbon monoxide during the 1970s is not a good indicator of
what action the agency will take with respect to carbon dioxide
today-the two are very different chemicals that present widely
variant risks and raise distinct economic questions. Similarly, the fact
that the EPA has acted once to regulate the level of arsenic in
drinking water has ambiguous effects on the likelihood that the
agency will act again, either to raise or lower allowable levels. It may
indicate that a similarly situated EPA will tighten the arsenic standard;
it may lead the EPA to learn that the current level of protection is
needlessly high and prompt a relaxation of those limits; or it may
simply indicate that the EPA already has selected a near-optimal level
of regulation and the status quo is likely to persist. Based on available
quantitative data alone, an outside observer has almost no capacity to
select among these possibilities.'"' Even the meaning of potential
explanatory variables can change over time, and often rapidly.
Democrats in Georgia in 1972 were very different than Democrats in
Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24
L. & POL'Y REV. 149 (2006) (describing effect of differing cultural woridviews on
risk perception and policy priorities); Masur, supra note 7, at 1041-47 (describing possibility of rapid shifts in government policy and potentially deleterious effects of such shifts).
109 See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV.
ENvTL. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2007) (describing public reaction to discovery of ozone-depleting
effects and subsequent industry reductions on production).
110 It is, of course, possible that some major change in law or technology-the repeal of
speed limits or the advent of airbags-could have dramatic effects on accident rates or
costs. But these sorts of events are uncommon and often predictable, and they produce
new equilibria that again become susceptible to large-scale data collection and analysis. In
the end, our point is a comparative one: Pricing automobile insurance has become a science due to the predictable nature of accident rates, but pricing regulatory insurance
remains ineluctably an art.
111 In other words, automobile accidents are independent events, while regulatory activities are not. Because of the idiosyncrasies inherent to the regulatory process, it is unlikely
that insurers will have enough information to navigate the endogeneities involved in
pricing insurance contracts.
108 Cf.

YALE
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Georgia in 1992, who were in turn very different than Democrats in
Georgia in 2006.112
Third, the likelihood of regulation may well be endogenous to the
rate of insurance. Suppose that a firm that manufactures a hazardous
chemical insures against regulation of that chemical, and the insurance
company includes a clause in the insurance contract barring the firm
from lobbying. 113 The existence of this insurance contract alters the
probability of regulation: Congress or an agency may be subject to
more or less lobbying activity, depending on whether the insurer
chooses to lobby in the firm's stead. But an insurer writing a policy at
time x may not know whether other industrial firms will choose to
insure (with other insurance companies) at times x+1, x+2, and so
forth, and thus may be unable to gauge the likelihood of regulation at
future moments.
Finally, much of the information needed to make possible finegrained analysis of the likelihood of some regulatory measure is not
publicly available, and many of the relevant government processes are
not transparent. Agencies are typically required to publish notice of
proposed rulemaking and solicit comments before the rules go into
effect, but this notice often comes late in the regulatory game, long
after principal decisiontmakers have decided to embark on a course of
action.' 14 A significant amount of regulatory law is also made through
adjudication, and potentially regulated firms may have little notice
that an issue is even before a court, much less subject to regulatory
change."15 Similarly, legislative actions are nominally public-a bill is
112 Cf. Merle Black, The Transformation of the Southern Democratic Party, 66 J. PaL.
1001, 1002-05 (2004) (describing diminishing power and presence of conservative whites in
southern Democratic Party over time and rise of Republican Party as viable alternative).
113 As noted above, this type of clause is likely to be included in a regulatory insurance
contract in order to avoid risks associated with moral hazard. See supra notes 76-80 and
accompanying text.
114 See Beth S. Noveck & David R. Johnson, A Complex(ity) Strategy for Breaking the
Logjam, 17 N.Y.U. ENv-rL. L.J. 170, 177 (2008) (describing regulations as "a fait accompli"
before traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking purports to solicit outside expertise);
see also E. Donald Elliott, Re-inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492-94 (1992)
(arguing that formal public notice-and-comment procedures have little to no effect on
rulemaking but are used primarily to build detailed record for judicial review after proposed rule has already "jelled" into its final form); Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency:
Theory Maintenance and Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. Prrr. L. REV. 589, 621-23
(2002) (suggesting that agencies can suffer from "lock-in," or inflexible commitment to
previously decided upon policy, which undermines "regulatory goals of participation and
deliberation").
115 See Peter L. Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive
Department:Reflections on the InteriorDepartment's Administration of the Mining Law, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1238 (1974) (noting that decisions are often unavailable and that
affected parties often lack notification); Russell L. Weaver, Chenery MLA Forty-Year Ret-
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introduced, committees hold hearings, and votes are taken, all in the
public eye. Of course, in reality much of the salient legislative work
takes place behind closed doors in private meetings, and bills that
appear publicly to concern one topic can rapidly be transformed to
cover another. 116 These informational problems are not insurmountable-after all, automobile insurers do not have access to the private
thoughts of drivers in the moments before they lose concentration and
cause accidents. But, at a minimum, they complicate efforts to analyze
the probabilities of regulatory action based on observable factors by
raising the possibility of omitted variable bias.
Given a sufficient quantity of data, skilled economists and actuaries might be able to sort through this extensive variation and arrive at
reasonably predictive models. It may be that the likelihood of water
quality regulation is highly correlated with the number of Democrats
on a particular committee and the number of years until the committee chairman must run for reelection. But with a comparatively
small number of regulatory actions in any given time period, there is
simply no opportunity to amass the data necessary to render such calculations feasible or meaningful. Regulatory insurance would force
insurers to radically alter the way in which they traditionally do business, moving toward more subjective evaluation of likely political outcomes. This is an activity for which they are ill-suited, and requires a
set of skills that few people within these firms likely possess. 117 And
without either workable data or fine-grained political expertise,
insurers simply will be unable to price regulatory contracts with any
accuracy. In the presence of such high uncertainty, it is not surprising

rospective, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 161, 165-66 (1988) (citing criticism of adjudicative process
for lack of notice or public input).
116 See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld. Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption.
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of FederalPower, 57 DUKE LiJ. 1933, 1949-52 (2008)
(arguing that internal congressional processes, including private conference committee
meetings and strategic voting behavior, lead to legislative transparency that is "only skin
deep" for all but most savvy and connected special interest groups).
117 Cf W. Brinkley Dickerson, Jr. et al., Note to SEC. "Reasonably Likely To Be
Enacted?" You Have Got To Be Kidding!, TROUTMAN SANDERS, Mar. 3, 2010, http://www.
troutmansanders.com/note-to-sec-reasonably-likely-to-be-enacted-you-have-got-to-bekidding-03-03-2010 (citing Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act Release
No. 9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010)) (expressing
disbelief that private firms could possibly gauge which regulations or legislation are likely
to be enacted in given year). The SEC interpreted § 303 of Regulation SK, 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.303 (2009). to require management to "evaluate whether . .. pending legislation or
regulation is reasonably likely to be enacted. Unless management determines that it is not
reasonably likely to be enacted, it must proceed on the assumption that the legislation or
regulation will be enacted." Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6296.
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that insurance companies have shied away from entering the
market.""8
C

Government Facilitationof a Market for Regulatory Insurance

In many cases, government intervention can be useful in ameliorating the problems that prevent robust private markets from developing.' 19 Government-provided legal support for the insurance
industry is nothing new, despite the fact that governmental involvement is hardly essential to the existence of traditional private insurance. For instance, criminal penalties for insurance fraud-which are
publicly administered and funded-serve as a valuable supplement to
private contract remedies. 20 The case for government intervention in
the market for regulatory insurance is even stronger and more
straightforward. If, in fact, it is a lack of transparency and certainty in
governmental operations that causes pricing problems and inhibits the
growth of a market for regulatory insurance, then the government
might be able to remedy this failure through greater clarity and the
provision of more complete public information.
Accordingly, Congress (or state legislatures) could take a number
of steps to facilitate the pricing of insurance contracts on regulatory
action. The legislature could force agencies to set agendas and priori118 We suspect that a similar explanation underlies the lack of catastrophe or terrorism
insurance. Devastating hurricanes and crippling acts of terrorism are similarly infrequent,
highly contingent events for which no reliable actuarial data exists. Lacking traditional
predictive tools, insurers are likely reticent to gamble on uncertain outcomes with high
variance.
119 Cf. Robert B. Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in the
Creation of Strong Securities Markets,- 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 336-41 (2003) (suggesting
that government can play role in overcoming network effects that might impede development of robust private markets); Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 BYU L.
REV. 1179, 1184-95 (describing situations in which government regulation is and is not
necessary to facilitate private ordering).
120 In theory, increased sanctions for fraud help to deter fraudulent behavior by consumers, lowering costs for insurers and reducing the premiums that honest insurance customers must pay. Cf Mark A. Cohen, The Economics of Crime and Punishment:
Implications for Sentencing of Economic Crimes and New Technology Offenses, 9 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 503, 506-07 (2000) (discussing fraud risk and attempts to prevent fraud as
increasing costs for other consumers). Similarly, securities disclosure laws such as
Sarbanes-Oxley represent governmental attempts to cure irrationalities, failures, and information asymmetries in the securities markets. See Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). Whether they are
successful or necessary is a separate matter, and one on which we express no opinion here.
Compare J. Robert Brown, Jr., Criticizing the Critics: Sarbanes-Oxtey and Quack Corporate Governance, 90 MARO. L. REv. 309, 319-34 (2006) (arguing that it is too early to
determine whether Sarbanes-Oxley has been successful), with Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley
and the Cross-listing Premium, 105 Micfl. L. REV. 1857, 1875-95 (2007) (finding that
Sarbanes-Oxley has created greater costs than benefits for certain classes of firms as investors believed it would).
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ties well in advance of action, deviating from a set agenda only upon a
showing of particular need. Congress could curtail ex parte contacts
and lobbying between regulated firms and policymakers, forcing a
greater proportion of agency activity and decisionmaking into public
view. Similarly, Congress could scale back the provisions of the APA
that permit agencies to make rules without opportunity for notice and
comment. 121 Congress could even go so far as to limit the number of
regulations that an agency could promulgate in a given year,
restricting the flow of potential agency actions. 122 And Congress or
the courts could adjust the rules that allow numerous agencies, such as
the National Labor Relations Board, to make policy through case-bycase adjudication, forcing regulatory actors toward the greater certainty of notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Similarly, Congress could alter its own behavior in order to provide greater predictability to regulated firms. It could rewrite the rules
governing floor amendments to prohibit significant legislative modification from taking place outside of the more structured confines of
committees. Congress could force committees to set their agendas further in advance in order to provide greater notice or require that
sponsors publish potential amendments well in advance. Indeed, one
could imagine a panoply of classic "good government" mechanisms
that Congress could draw upon to make the processes of legislation
more transparent and predictable to regulated firms and their putative
insurers.123
In the end, however, all of these measures would produce little
more than marginal gains. There is nothing that the government can
do to ameliorate the fundamental lack of regulatory data (other than
dramatically increase the rate of regulation). And there is little that
the government can do to improve the problems that attend extrapolation of one data point to another-for instance, the fact that arsenic
regulation in Period 1 has ambiguous effects on arsenic regulation in
Period 2.124 Congress might demand a wholesale yearly reevaluation
by every agency of every regulatory standard in place (and of all cur121 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2006) (permitting rulemaking without notice and comment
under certain circumstances).
122 Of course, significant costs would accompany these measures-costs that might well
outweigh whatever benefits they would provide. We raise these possibilities only as a
thought experiment, in the interest of analyzing what measures Congress might take to
facilitate pricing of regulatory insurance.
123 See generally Teresa Dale Pupillo, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in
the Sunshine in the 1990s-An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1165
(1993) (cataloging state "sunshine laws" that provide for open government and greater
public information on legislative and regulatory processes).
124 See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
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rently unregulated areas as well), but it is highly unlikely that the benefits of such an effort would justify its enormous costs.
In addition, there are bQth practical and political limits to how
predictable and transparent government action can become. Government must always be able to adapt to changing circumstances and
respond to new problems, and so it is unrealistic to expect all agenda
setting to take place years or even months in advance. And it is unreasonable to believe that all relevant policymnaking could (or should) be
forced into public view. Governments, like private firms, depend on
being able to debate and decide certain questions in secret, and there
are many regulatory decisions that agencies would be unwise to make
in fully public fashion.' 25 The unregimented nature of the democratic
process is responsible for the preponderance of the pricing problems
that inhibit a market for regulatory insurance from developing, and
these problems cannot be cured without twisting the democratic process into unrecognizable shape.
In the end, we remain pessimistic about the prospects for the
development of a thick market for regulatory insurance. The theoretical hurdles to pricing such contracts are significant, given the infrequency and incommensurability of regulation at the national or state
level. Governmental options for facilitating the growth of such a
market are inadequate and not well-targeted to the market's fundamental problems. Were the absence of such a market attributable to
mere moral hazard or adverse selection problems, the government
might be capable of curing the market's failure through increased dissemination of information or even mandatory disclosures of private
conditions backed by penalties for fraud. But the deeper difficulties
involved in accurately pricing such uncertain instruments cannot be so
easily solved.
III
INFORMATION MARKETS AND REGULATORY DERIVATIVES

If we cannot trust governmental actors to provide efficient transition relief, and if the difficulties involved in properly pricing regulatory insurance frustrate private insurance markets, then perhaps
traders could develop financial derivatives that would allow firms to
hedge their regulatory risk. This Part explores that possibility.
125 See, e.g., DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321, 1332 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1974) (permitting agency to avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking because of fear that
private parties would evade rules and render them useless); Clay Broad. Corp. of Tex. v.
United States, 464 F.2d 1313, 1320 (5th Cir. 1971) (permitting agency to proceed without
notice-and-comment rulemaking because of unacceptable delay that procedure would
entail).
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Regulatory Derivatives in Conception

A derivative is simply the genus name for any financial instrument that acquires a particular value on a given date based on some
underlying event or set of circumstances. For instance, a derivative
might be pegged to the S&P 500 Index and be worth one cent for each
point at which the index is valued when it closes on December 31,
2010.126

The originating financial institution simply specifies through

contract language the terms upon which investors will value the derivative, and then investors can trade the derivatives on open financial
markets as if they were typical stocks. The trading price will reflect the
market's prediction as to the likelihood of the outcome in question. 127
Derivatives have proven useful for hedging risk in a variety of
contexts in which traditional insurance is unavailable because of one
type of market failure or another. For instance, farmers often fear
wide swings in profits due to weather variations; a particularly dry
year can cause immense damage to a crop and put an agricultural business at risk of failure. Standard crop insurance, however, which would
compensate a farmer directly for a lean year, is expensive and difficult
to purchase because risks tend to be systemic and thus "cannot be
diversified away." 128 A farmer who has insurance might not make all
reasonable efforts to protect a crop-particularly if those efforts are
expensive-and it could be difficult for an insurer to monitor the
farmer's behavior without stationing an auditor at the farm around
the clock. Similarly, farmers might have private information regarding
their own susceptibility to drought (the quality of their irrigation systems, for instance), and would opt for insurance only when their risk is
especially high.
The solution is a weather-indexed derivative, pegged to the
amount of rainfall or sunshine in a particular region during a particular growing season.' 29 For instance, a derivative might be valued at
$1 for every inch of rainfall that eastern Kansas receives in June, July,
and August. A farmer assesses how much money she stands to lose if
rainfall drops below a certain level and trades enough derivatives to
126 In a more straightforward fashion, a bank might create a derivative that is worth $1 if
the S&P 500 Index closes above 1000 points on December 31, 2010, and $0 if it closes
below 1000 points on that date. A derivative might also be written to be worth $1 if the
Boston Red Sox win the 2010 World Series and $0 if they do not.
127 For instance, if the median trader believes that there is a fifty percent chance that the
Red Sox will win the World Series, the Red Sox derivatives will trade at around fifty cents.
128 Miranda & Vedenov, supra note 93, at 650 (adding that high rates lead to decreased
demand and adverse selection problems).
129 Id. at 652. The derivative solves the moral hazard problem by acquiring value based
on events (e.g., the weather) that no one can control, as opposed to events that are under
the farmer's influence (e.g., the farmer's crop yield).
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cover those losses. By buying and selling weather derivatives, a farmer
can guarantee a consistent income across a period of years while
paying only a small premium to smooth out the variance generated by
dramatic swings in the weather.
Similarly, the Chicago Board of Trade sells derivatives pegged to
the Case-Shiller Housing Index, an economic measure of the value of
a median home in major metropolitan areas across the country. 130
Suppose a homeowner in San Francisco wishes to insure herself
against a decline in the value of her home. Direct, first-party insurance
is unavailable. It is too difficult to price the homeowner's loss unless
she actually sells her house, and even a sale creates moral hazard
problems because the homeowner and the insurance company may
not agree on how much time and energy the homeowner should invest
in extracting the best price or how long the house should remain on
the market. Instead, the homeowner can purchase (or, more accurately, sell short) enough Case-Shiller futures to cover potential losses,
figuring that declines in the median home price will be proportional to
declines in the value of her own home. Because -no single person can
manipulate an entire housing market, Case-Shiller derivatives both
solve the moral hazard problem and allow individuals to recover
losses from declining home values without ever putting their homes
up for sale.
It is easy to imagine how people might design and deploy derivatives as hedges against regulatory risk. A financial institution could
simply create a wide variety of derivative products pegged to potential
regulations: a derivative worth $1 if the EPA acts to regulate a given
chemical by a particular date and $0 otherwise; a derivative pegged to
the carbon tax rate imposed by Congress (conditional on Congress
creating a carbon tax); and so forth. Regulated firms would calculate
their own potential losses in the event of regulation and trade the
derivatives in the quantities necessary to insure against those losses.
As long as the derivatives were designed with adequate specificity, a
firm should have little trouble locating an appropriate financial hedge.
In fact, these types of derivatives are functionally equivalent to
already-existing information markets. Information markets offer
traders the opportunity to place bets on future events with the object
of generating information as to the probability of that event occurring.
For instance, Intrade, an Irish information market, offers derivatives
contracts based upon events such as whether the United States will
130 See Standard & Poor's, Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, http://www.standardand
poors.com/home/en/us (follow "S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
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impose domestic greenhouse gas limitations; whether a bill legalizing
internet gambling will pass; and whether the federal government will

provide an additional $25 billion to U.S. automakers in

2009.131

Cre-

ating vast numbers of additional markets to cover a panoply of potential regulations would be trivial; the only cost would be in the careful
definition and drafting of contract terms.132 Information markets are
meant to act as predictors of future events, not as mechanisms for
hedging substantial risks, but they will operate equally well as the
latter. The fact that many such markets already exist makes deploying
them as full-scale, effective sources of transition relief seem tantalizingly possible.
B.

The Failing Market for Derivatives

The Market's Absence

1.

Despite the obvious utility of derivatives as regulatory risk
hedges, and despite the existence of some roughly equivalent information markets, these financial products are underdeveloped and
underutilized to an extent that casts doubt on their long-term feasibility. There are currently no regulatory derivatives in existence, and
even the few regulation-related information markets that have sprung
up have garnered almost no attention. The three Intrade markets discussed in the previous Section have a total lifetime trading volume of

less than $1O,OOO.133 Without a robust market and substantial
liquidity-in the billions or trillions of dollars-such products are useless as mechanisms for hedging regulatory risk.
The underdevelopment of a robust market for regulatory derivatives mirrors the similar absence of regulatory insurance. Information
markets and derivatives, like standard insurance contracts, depend
upon assessments of probability: A trader will only buy or sell a derivative contract if she can estimate the likelihood of the event in quesIntrade, http://www.intrade.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2010).
There is also the matter of legalizing these markets in the United States; Intrade's
legal status is somewhat uncertain. The only operating real-money information market
whose legality is not in question in the United States is the Iowa Electronic Markets, run
by the University of Iowa's Tippie College of Business. See Iowa Electronic Markets,
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/ieml/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). There is also a new information
market that plans to allow participants to bet real money on Hollywood box office figures.
See Joseph Plambeck, A Place To Bet Real Money on Movies, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 10, 2010,
available at http://www.nytimes~comI2OlO/3/1lbusiness/media/llfutures.html. Of course,
this market will be of little interest to regulated firms outside of Hollywood.
133 Intrade, supra note 131 (use "Market Search" to locate market, then look at value in
"Vol" column of displayed table). This low trading volume is potentially due to a number
of factors, including the questionable legality of trading on Intrade and the lack of interest
in those particular markets. Still, the extremely modest volume is striking and likely indicative of larger problems.
131
132
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tion to some degree of certainty. 34 Accordingly, firms will struggle to
price these financial products accurately for all of the same reasons
that insurance companies cannot price standard first-person regulatory insurance. 35 Regulated firms will be loath to invest substantial
resources in ventures shrouded in such uncertainty; after all, the point
is to hedge risk, and trading in uncertain regulatory derivatives has a
great deal more in common with gambling.
Derivatives markets function differently, however, than firstparty insurance markets in important ways. Adverse selection
problems are unknown in derivatives markets because the identities of
the participants are irrelevant. How much the party on the other side
of the transaction stands to lose if the government regulates does not
affect the costs to a given derivatives trader. Similarly, parties could
easily avoid any threat of correlated risks simply by avoiding
purchasing too large a bundle of linked derivatives.
On the other hand, moral hazard problems are greater in the context of derivatives trades than in that of first-person insurance because
it is difficult for trading parties to write sophisticated contracts. As we
note above, insurance firms can solve the moral hazard problem by
writing contracts that bar insured parties from lobbying.' 36 On a derivatives market, this is not so easy. In order for the derivatives contracts
to be tradable on an exchange, the contracts must be standardized.
The parties will not be able to negotiate them on an individualized
basis. Even if the standard derivatives contract specified that neither
the purchaser nor the seller may lobby-a condition that most parties
are unlikely to accept-the holders of these derivatives are often difficult to identify after the fact. Accordingly, it is likely that a thick
derivatives market does not exist due to some combination of the
same pricing problems that plague first-party insurance and the threat
of moral hazard.
The government could, of course, attempt to catalyze such a
market on its own by acting as a broker.. It could sell fixed-price bundles of derivatives-for instance, a derivative worth $1 if the EPA regulates carbon dioxide packaged with a derivative worth $1 if it does
not-in the hope that firms would then trade those financial products
among themselves.' 37 Or it could auction regulatory derivatives in the
same manner as it does Treasury bills and allow the auction to set the
134 Cf. supra Part IILA (discussing need for regulatory insurance in order to encourage
investment).
135 See supra Part II.B.4 (discussing difficulty of pricing regulatory insurance).
136 See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
137 This is the approach currently taken by the Iowa Electronic Markets. For an analysis
of different methods for structuring prediction markets, see Michael Abramowicz, Infor-
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price. 138 Yet none of these solutions will cure endemic pricing or
moral hazard problems, and none will induce the necessary levels of
participation if firms cannot already price the derivatives accurately.
As a class, derivatives are useful mechanisms for solving certain types
of market failures and for making insurance contracts tradable on
open markets. They are not panaceas for preexisting difficulties in
pricing risk.139
2.

A Hybrid Proposal

While we are not optimistic that a market solution exists to the
problems inhibiting the growth of a regulatory derivatives market, we
believe that the most promising avenue lies with a hybrid system of
information markets and insurance. As they currently exist, information markets cannot produce sufficient liquidity to serve as effective
mechanisms for hedging regulatory risk. Yet firms might nonetheless
be able to employ them as a way of facilitating private first-party
insurance.
Even under conditions of low liquidity, there exist mechanisms
for generating predictions (and incentivizing investment in accurate
forecasts) in information markets. Firms can subsidize participation in
information markets-providing individuals with money that they can
use to place bets in the market-in order to induce parties with primation Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71
U. CHI. L. REv. 933, 948-49 (2004).
138 See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, How Treasury Auctions Work, http://www.treasury
direct.gov/instit/auctfund/work/work.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
139 Firms might also attempt to hedge risk by engaging in more unconventional
behavior, such as purchasing other companies whose success is negatively correlated with
their own. For instance, imagine that Ford Motor Company is considering making substantial investments in designing vehicles powered by natural gas. If executives at Ford fear
that greenhouse gas regulation could raise the price of natural gas and diminish consumer
interest in the cars, they might consider purchasing a company that manufactures wind
energy turbines as a hedge. Yet this option is hardly straightforward. At the limit, it might
commit a firm to owning and running another company engaged in a completely separate-even diametrically opposed-business. It is surely not efficient for executives at an
automobile company to manage a wind energy firm.
Even if nothing more than the purchase of stock were involved, firms still face significant hurdles in finding the proper hedge. Imagine that, instead of buying a wind energy
corporation, Ford instead makes a significant investment in the firm. Ford would now be
forced to hedge against losses by that company that have nothing to do with greenhouse
gas regulation-for instance, a general downturn in demand for wind turbines, or an
increase in the price of a key production input. These hedges might in turn create further
risks, which Ford would cover with additional investments. This in turn would create further risks, and so forth. In essence, a firm would be forced to acquire a highly complex
bundle of securities in a quixotic effort to isolate a specific business risk. It is thus not
surprising that this type of behavior is not widely observed.
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vate information to participate. 1 40 In the alternative, a sophisticated
information market employing either a dynamic pari-mutuel design14 1

or a market scoring system'14 2

Will,

in theory, operate effectively even

if only one individual participates. These designs can accommodate
any trading volume, large or small.' 43 Information markets of these
types could turn inputs from even small numbers of interested individuals into aggregated predictions, assuming that the individuals
brought at least small amounts of information to the market. If these
information markets were viewed as sufficiently accurate-a significant caveat, we recognize-insurance companies might feel comfortable in pricing regulatory insurance according to their predictions. The
effect would be to bootstrap an extremely large first-party insurance
market with a small but reliable prediction tool.
As an initial matter, one might wonder why insurance companies
would ever believe that an information market was accurate enough
to fill a pricing function where derivatives markets and the insurers
themselves had failed. The answer is that information markets might
chart a middle course between these two high-volume alternatives. As
an alternative to internally priced insurance, they might be substantially more accurate at predicting outcomes than firm experts (as they
have proven to be in other contexts). 1 " And in comparison to derivatives markets, they might be able to succeed with vastly smaller investments of capital. Derivatives markets depend on large numbers of
firms being willing to invest substantial sums in order to provide the
140 See Abramowicz, supra note 137, at 961-92 (analyzing usefulness of subsidizing prediction markets); Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, PredictionMarkets for Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1351-53 (2007) (describing process of
subsidizing corporate prediction markets). Ideally, the relevant governmental policymakers-agency employees and congressional staff-would be involved, although such
efforts might be foiled by public corruption and gift laws. See 5 U.S.C. § 7353 (2006)
(prohibiting gifts to federal employees); 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (federal public corruption
law).
141 See David M. Pennock, A Dynamic Pari-MutuelMarket for Hedging, Wagering, and
Information Aggregation, in EC '04: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH ACM CONFERENCE ON
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 170, 171-78 (2004) (describing design of pari-mutuel information
market, which can continuously incorporate information and is highly liquid and risk-free
for market institutions).
142 See Robin Hanson, Combinatorial Information Market Design, 5 IrNFO. Sy~s. FRONTIERS 107, 109-13 (2003) (describing design of market scoring system, which aims to overcome incentive problems for information acquisition and sharing).
143 See Abramowicz, supra note 137, at 959-60 (describing operation and virtues of
market scoring systems); Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 140, at 1352-53 (same);
Pennock, supra note 141, at 171 (describing "infinite liquidity" of pari-mutuel markets). A
full description of the operation of these types of markets is beyond the scope of this
Article. For further discussion, see sources cited supra notes 141-43.
144 See Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 140, at 1346 (reviewing literature on prediction markets' success).
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liquidity necessary to hedge business risk, and firms likely feel far too
vulnerable to trade on the information they possess. However, even a
small, risk-averse cadre of individuals with valuable private information and little access to capital could generate reasonable predictions.
A congressional aide who knows the likely fate of a bill cannot provide enough liquidity to allow a major company to hedge its risk, but
she might be able to orient an information market upon which a major
insurer could then rely. It is as if insurance firms would be hiring the
federal bureaucracy for their risk analysis divisions.
We hasten to add that this suggestion is fraught with other significant difficulties. As we note above, it might be impossible for the government employees in possession of the best information to
participate. 145 Information markets might also be highly subject to
manipulation if the price of vast quantities of insurance contracts
turned on far fewer dollars in informational trades. 146 And, of course,
pricing problems and moral hazard issues might simply be insurmountable. Those concerns notwithstanding, this hybrid proposal may
be the most promising of an unattractive set of options, and it would
be relatively inexpensive to attempt a small experiment. There is thus
little reason not to search for further innovative solutions.147
Nevertheless, the moribund private market for regulatory insurance and derivatives seems unlikely to provide a satisfactory solution
to the problem of regulatory risk. Having found few promising avenues within the private markets, we turn our attention in the next Part
to possible mechanisms by which the government might provide
meaningful transition relief.

IV
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND LEGAL
TRANSITION RELIEF

Based upon the discussion in Parts 11 and III above, the rise of a
private market adequate to provide substantial transition relief is
unlikely. In the absence of a private market for transition relief, the
145 Nonetheless, it might be interesting to witness the newly incentivized newsgathering
by Washington, D.C., reporters if such a system were in place.
146 Cf. Posting of Jonathan Masur to University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog,
Strategic Manipulation of the Information Markets, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/
2008/10/Just-over-a-wee.hitmrl (Oct. 6, 2008, 01:40:13 PM) (describing potential manipulation of Intrade political markets during 2008 election).
147 In addition, a relatively accurate information market could produce other benefits,
even if it never generated sufficient liquidity to allow firms to hedge. If the market
reflected a high probability of legal change, firms could respond accordingly in anticipation. The same would be true for regulatory insurance, were it to exist. If premiums
reflected a high likelihood of regulation, firms could anticipate legal change.

Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law

436

436

UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
YORK
~NEW

[o.8:985:391
[Vol.

government remains a viable option. As we explained in Part I.C,
however, there are reasons why we would not expect the government
to excel at providing appropriate transition relief. In particular, the
government lacks adequate information and is subject to capture and
lobbying. Our goal in this Part, then, is to consider the institutional
structures that will best accentuate the government's advantages and
mitigate its shortcomings.
We proceed in three stages. First, we unbundle the various steps
that compose transition relief, and we explain how the decisions or
decisionmaking involved in some of those steps differ from those
involved in other steps (and from decisions and decisionmaking in the
ordinary regulatory context). We organize these various steps along a
continuum ranging from broad, sweeping judgments to narrow, individualized determinations. We argue that broad decisions are more
likely to involve substantial value judgments, while narrow ones are
more likely technocratic and value-independent. Second, we offer a
typology of various government actors-the legislature, an executive
agency, the judiciary, and an independent agency-and discuss the
benefits and drawbacks typically associated with each institution, with
reference to the standard considerations of expertise, democratic
accountability, and the threat of capture. We also explain how many
of these benefits and drawbacks may have particular prominence in
the context of legal transition relief. Third, we offer recommendations
on institutional structure based on the analysis in the first and second
Sections. This analysis is necessarily simplified; a full consideration of
the near-infinite variety (and relative merits) of government institutions is well beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, we believe
that the analysis will allow us to obtain some purchase on the question
of which type of institutional actor is best positioned to decide various
questions related to transition relief.
For ease of exposition, we will summarize three important points
on which our conclusions rest. First, some decisions regarding transition relief are more akin to plenary lawmaking. These decisions affect
numerous societal actors and draw their resolution from broad societal values. 148 Here, one might think of the broad decision of whether
transition relief is warranted in the first instance. Other decisions are
more in the nature of applications of an existing legal structure to particular private actors. Numerous issues that arise in transition relief
settings are highly technocratic (as opposed to value-laden) in this
148 Cf. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915)
(holding that due process right to direct voice in adoption of policy does not attach to
broad legislative decisions that affect large swaths of population).
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sense: for instance, whether a modification of an existing structure
should subject the structure to regulation as if it were new construction; 149 whether a transaction was consummated before or after the
advent of a new legal regime; 150 and how to allocate limited funds or
grandfathering rights. 151
Second, consider the role of expertise in making these narrow,
technocratic decisions. To be sure, expertise in the particular area of
law at issue is of some value. But that kind of expertise is often
exceeded in value by more general expertise in meting out transition
relief. Questions that arise in these decisions transcend particular
areas of law. The question of whether a modification should be

treated as a new construction arises in environmental law,' 52 land use
law, 153 and disabilities law, 154 to name just a few areas. The question

of whether a transaction should be deemed consummated before or

after a legal change takes effect arises in tax law' 5 5 and bankruptcy
law. 156 And the question of how to distribute limited funds or
grandfathering rights arises in environmental law' 5 7 and natural
resources law.' 58 This strongly suggests that a single government
agency could accumulate considerable relevant expertise were it

149 See, e.g., Nash & Revesz, supra note 2, at 1713-15 (describing how "new source
review" under Clean Air Act applies where modification to existing facility which otherwise would be grandfathered is "substantial").
150 See, e.g., Logue, supra note 7, at 1176-80 (describing difficulty of deciding this question in context of changes to tax law).
151 See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography:
Designing Marketable Schemes To Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 569, 585 (2001) [hereinafter Nash & Revesz, Markets and Geography] (describing
methods by which permits are grandfathered under Clean Air Act's national sulfur dioxide
trading program).
152 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
153 See PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 41.03[4]-[51 (2009)
(discussing grandfathering in zoning laws).
154 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2) (2006) (providing that facility owners shall make
alterations "to the maximum extent feasible" so that "the path of travel to the altered area
and the bathrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area[]I are
readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities" but only "where such alterations . .. are not disproportionate to the overall alterations in terms of cost and scope"
(emphasis added)); 28 C.F.R. § 36.403(f)(1) (2009) ("Alterations made to provide an accessible path of travel to the altered area will be deemed disproportionate to the overall alteration when the cost exceeds 20% of the cost of the alteration to the primary function
area.")
155 See supra note 150.
156 See, e.g., Stephen W. Sather, The Great Bankruptcy Rush of 2005 and Its Aftermath:
The View from Texas, Am. BANKR. INST. L. Rnv., Sept. 2006, at 34, 34 ("[T~he signing of
set off a
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ...
massive rush to the bankruptcy courts.").
157 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
158 See generally Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty, supra note 7 (discussing methods of
allocating finite natural resources).
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charged with handling such transition relief decisions across various
legal specialties.
Third, private actors will naturally be willing to invest money and
time to obtain transition relief, and government actors will face an
incentive to mete it out in return for private benefits.' 59 A government
actor that is charged with distributing transition relief-even in accordance with some set legal scheme-likely will enjoy some discretion in
making those decisions.'60 The less that a government body is subject
to outside influence, the less it will fall prey to private rent-seeking in
the allocation of transition relief. Accordingly, we conclude that an
independent agency might be best situated to make some decisions
related to the provision and application of transition relief.
A.

The Composite Steps of Transition Relief

Our evaluation of institutional design involves decomposing the
process of granting legal transition relief into constituent steps. We do
this for two reasons. First, different steps call for different types of
decisions and modes of decisionmaking; it may be that some institutional actors are better situated to undertake certain steps.16 1 Second,
in order to establish some checks on any one actor's authority (and
thus at least to raise the cost of successful lobbying), it may be desirable to vest different actors with authority over different parts of the
process.
There are several steps in the process of granting transition relief.
The first is the determination of whether there is any justification sufficient to warrant granting transition relief. Assuming some transition
relief is found to be appropriate, the second step is to decide what
form transition relief will assume. A third step is to determine who
will in fact be entitled to relief and who will not.
We unpack these steps in the following subsections. In doing so,
we describe the steps involved in transition relief along a continuum
ranging from broad, sweeping choices to narrow, individualized decisions. The former category is associated with developing a rule; the
latter with simply applying a rule that already has been crafted. Deci159 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of capture in
transition relief context).
160 Cf Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001) (rejecting argument that directive requiring agency to set standard to protect public health failed to provide "intelligible principle" against which to gauge agency action, thus indicating that
legislative delegation was proper).
161 Cf B. Timothy Heinmiller, The Politics of "Cap and Trade" Policies, 47 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 445, 449-51 (2007) (breaking process of implementing cap-and-trade emissions allowance regime into three steps-setting cap, allocating allowances, and then permitting trading-and noting that each step raises distinct political pressures and concerns).
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sionmaking of the former type is likely to be heavily value-ladenthat is, to turn upon normative values and political choices-while
decisionmaking of the latter type is likely to be more technocratic.16 2
Thbis stylized approach, of course, represents a significant oversimplification of the nuances of regulatory decisionmaking, and we do not
mean to claim that this is the best or only way of conceptualizing the
processes involved in transition relief. We believe only that viewing
the steps involved in transition relief through this lens sheds substantial light on the institutional actors best positioned to manage its
various aspects.' 63
1.

Deciding Whether Transition Relief Is Warranted

The step of deciding whether transition relief is warranted-in
keeping with the general aversion to transition relief discussed above
in Part L.A and based upon the criteria justifying transition relief that
we identified above in Part I.B3-is not dissimilar from the issues that
confront the legislature and regulators in structuring the new legal
regime itself. First, the decisions are heavily value-laden. 64 Questions
of legitimacy 65 and fairness' 66 are quite common in developing a new
legal regime, as is the issue of the extent to which the new regime may
affect the behavior of societal actors, perhaps especially with respect
to investment decisions.' 67 Indeed, even the decision of whether to
grant transition relief and secure the new legal regime, or to deny it
162 See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
163 In addition, we acknowledge that merely because we can disaggregate the constit-

uent steps of affording transition relief does not mean in practice that government actors in
fact divide the process in this way, or that responsibility for the steps is divvied up among
multiple actors. For example, the first phase of the sulfur dioxide emissions allowance
trading program under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 involved Congress
deciding (i) that allowances would be distributed via grandfathering, (ii) exactly which
industrial plants would receive allowances, and (iii) exactly how many allowances each
plant would receive. See Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN.
ENvTL. L.J. 300, 328-32 (1995) (discussing evidence of groups influencing Congress in
establishing Clean Air program); Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political
Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. &
ECON. 37, 51-58 (1998) (same); Nash & Revesz, Markets and Geography, supra note 151,
at 585 (summarizing initial allowance allocation). Some existing practices, of course, may
not be normatively desirable. Our point is simply that disaggregation allows us to consider
what distributions of responsibility would be normatively preferable.
164 See, e.g., Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343, 352 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing
value of transition relief).
165 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (discussing legitimacy as possible justification for transition relief).
166 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (discussing fairness as possible justification for transition relief).
167 See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text (discussing investment incentives as
possible justification for transition relief).
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and thus catalyze opposition to the new regime, is itself heavily valueladen. 168 Accordingly, decisionmaking as to whether transition relief is
warranted is best characterized as broad rather than narrow. The decision is at a high enough level of generality that it avoids confronting
specific questions as to whether particular actors will get relief and
what form that relief will take.
2.

Deciding upon the Form and Quantity of Transition Relief

Once a decision has been reached to offer some transition relief,
the next step is to consider how much relief is to be offered and the
form in which it is to be offered. The answer to the second question
may affect the first: If the government uses cash to pay directly at least
some people who used to engage in the activity, then the question of
how much relief there will be reduces to the amount of funds that will
be made available. On the other hand, if the government grandfathers
rights, then the government may decide to cap expressly the total
extent to which actors might use the grandfathering rights-that is, to
cap the total amount of grandfathered activity allowed going forward-or it might decide simply to limit the total number of actors
who receive grandfathered rights (with any such actor free to engage
in the prior behavior as much as he or she would like), thus limiting
the total amount of grandfathered activity only indirectly.
Whether the government conveys relief under a cap-and-trade
system, under a grandfathering regime, or by means of compensation,
there is a strongly value-laden core decision concerning the acceptable
amount of the regulated activity that should be allowed to continueor the appropriate amount of money to compensate those barred from
previously acceptable activity. 169 These types of decisions will inevitably involve tradeoffs between government priorities, and between
economic concerns and other considerations (such as health and
safety) that the regulation was meant to address in the first instance.
Because of the incentive effects created by transition relief, every
decision either to provide or withhold such relief-and decisions as to
the form it will take-will influence both the reach of the regulatory
168 See Levmore, supra note 7, at 1665-67 (discussing tradeoffs involved in decision to
compensate politically powerful losers when enacting new regulatory scheme).
169 Cf. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 49, at 1353 (lauding tradable pollution permit
regimes over command-and-control regimes to achieve environmental goals on ground
that former regimes vest important decision of how much overall pollution should be
allowed with legislature, thus enhancing democracy); Sunstein, Administrative Substance,
supra note 49, at 636 (same); Sunstein, Democratizing America, supra note 49, at 967
(same).
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program (and thus its effects) and the economic impact on private
parties.
As an example, consider a decision to limit emissions of a pollutant using a cap-and-trade system.' 70 A higher total emissions cap will
lead to a smaller environmental impact but a smaller economic impact
as well. On the other hand, a lower emissions cap will induce greater
environmental protection at the cost of a greater economic burden.
The impact, in terms of both environmental protection and economics, may also vary across time: Some cap-and-trade programs are
designed to phase out particular emissions and thus have caps that
progressively decrease on a yearly basis,' 71 but many programs simply
put in place a cap that persists for many years.' 72 Alternatively, transition relief in the form of cash transfers to affected firms would not
substantially diminish the impact of pollution caps or alter the

behavior of private parties, but it would drain the government

fisc.' 7 3

Choosing between different types of transition relief structures thus
requires tradeoffs among a wide variety of public policy
considerations.
3.

Deciding Who Gets Transition Relief

Decisions as to who should receive transition relief fall into two
categories: broader decisions as to the inclusion or exclusion of classes
of recipients and narrower case-by-case decisions that determine the
ultimate allocation of transition relief. No matter what the form of
transition relief, questions as to which classes of actors should receive
relief will arise. For example, programs that protect fisheries by capping annual fishing catches raise questions as to whether fishing boat
owners alone, or, in addition, those who work on the boats, should
receive individual fishing quotas.' 74 Similarly, if the government uses
170 In a cap-and-trade system, the government caps the total acceptable amount (over a
period of time, usually a year) of behavior that the new legal regime otherwise outlaws. It
then divides that total cap among a number that it distributes to societal actors, who then
may trade them. Nash, supra note 47, at 321. Each permit authorizes its holder to engage in
a set amount of the restricted behavior, and only those with permits may engage in the
behavior at all. Id.
171 The EPA's tradable permits program, though not technically an emissions regulation
program, phased out the use of lead in gasoline during the 1980s. See Nash, supra note 49,
at 488-89.
172 See Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving
Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 395, 407 (2009) (describing cap employed by
Chicago Emissions Reduction Market System).
173 Cf. supra note 59 (arguing that fixed insurance payments will not change firms'
incentives at margin).
174 See Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343 (9th Cir. 1996) (adjudicating litigation challenging allocation of fisheries quotas). In Alliance, the court considered a chal-
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compensation to effect transition relief, should boat owners alone-or
more generally those with capital investments-receive compensation,
or should the government also make payments to those who work on
the boats? Should transition relief be limited to firms who suffer
directly under a new legal regime, 75 or should employees 76 or consumers receive some sort of relief as well? And of course there may be
questions as to which particular actors within these groups should
receive transition relief. These questions are narrower and more individualized than the decisions we have discussed to this point.
Put another way, the remaining task is to allocate the amount of
transition relief authorized among those actors whom the government
has designated as possible recipients. This allocation task generally
will be fairly technocratic: It will involve allocating transition relief
according to general directives that already have been established.
Because it involves final decisions as to winners and losers, the allocation task is almost certain to invite substantial lobbying and capture
efforts-perhaps even more than attend other stages in the process. 177
lenge by workers that the council's allocation of quota shares to owners and lessees but not
workers was not, as the governing statute required, "fair and equitable." See id. at 348
(quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(4)(A) (2006)). Though it described the argument as "sensible," id, the court proceeded to reject the argument on two grounds. First, the statute did
not make the "fair and equitable" requirement the sole criteria with which the council had
to comply. See id. at 348-49. Second, the council's logic that owners and lessees have put
capital at risk and thus deserve quota shares was sound: "The Secretary thought that the
problem of overfishing resulted more from investment in boats than occupational choices
of fishermen, so the administrative remedy should be measured by ownership and leasing
of boats." Id. at 349.
175 In the context of international trade agreements, "safeguards relief" provisions provide loopholes that countries may invoke when a domestic industry is put in a precarious
economic position by the implementation of a new trade accord. For discussion, see, for
example, Alan 0. Sykes, The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons from the Steel Dispute, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 523, 526-38 (2004) (describing provisions in international trade
agreements and as implemented under U.S. law and discussing how such provisions work).
176 For example, trade adjustment assistance programs provide protection to those who
suffer disemployment by virtue of new free trade agreements. See 19 U.S.C. § 2271(a)
(2006) (establishing mechanism by which adversely affected workers may apply for relief);
Paul T. Decker & Walter Corson, International Trade and Worker Displacement: Evaluation of the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program,48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. Ray. 758, 759-60
(1995) (providing overview of Trade Adjustment Assistance program); see also Joskow &
Schmalensee, supra note 163, at 50 (describing controversy over Byrd Amendment to 1990
Clean Air Act that would have provided benefits to coal mine employees who lost their
jobs); Arnold WV.Reitze, Jr., The Legislative History of U.S. Air Pollution Control, 36
Hous. L. REv. 679, 721-22 (1999) (same).
177 See Heinmiller, supra note 161, at 457 ("Considering the high stakes nature of the
allocation process, users and potential users are strongly motivated to protect their essential self-interests, so the allocation process is best understood as a distributive conflict
between rival user groups presided over by governmental regulators .. .. [R]ival users ...
are typically multiple and highly fragmented.").
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In these senses, the analysis required here will differ fundamentally
from the other decisions that we have described.
Each of the three component steps that we identify could in
theory be undertaken by a different government actor: the legislature,
an executive branch agency, the judiciary, or an independent agency.
In each of the succeeding subsections, we consider the benefits and
drawbacks associated with each such government actor. We continue
to assume (a) that private insurance is unavailable, and (b) that either
Congress or an executive branch agency has seen fit to enact a new
legal regime. 178
B.

Government Actors

We turn now to consideration of the potential government managers of transition relief. There is, of course, an extensive literature on
the comparative advantages of legislatures, courts, and agencies, 179
178 The legislative and executive branches are not the only branches of government that
may promulgate a new legal regime. When a court announces a new decision, that
announcement itself may raise questions of legal transition relief. See infra notes 196-98
and accompanying text. This type of setting lies beyond the scope of this Article for several
reasons. First, courts announcing a new interpretation of law may believe, alternatively,
that they are actually announcing a "new rule" of law, or simply that they are "clarifying"
preexisting law. The latter case presumably does not raise questions of transition relief.
Second, to the extent that a court decision may have retroactive application, it traditionally
has been the court itself that determines the retroactive effect of its ruling. See, e.g., Harper
v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100 (1993) (finding prior ruling to have retroactive
effect and rejecting state court's ruling on issue of retroactivity). Indeed, efforts by other
branches to dictate retroactive effects of laws on court decisions have met with court disapproval on separation of powers grounds. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,
217-19 (1995) (declaring unconstitutional congressional attempt to use new, extended
statute of limitations to open cases already dismissed under old statute of limitations and
now-final judgments). But cf. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008) (holding that
state courts were free to apply new constitutional rule of criminal procedure retroactively
even where federal courts would not). Third, settings where courts announce new rules of
law lie beyond the paradigmatic "new legal regime" setting with which we are concerned in
this Article: We are interested here in settings where there is a new, broad legal regime
affecting numerous actors. Courts rarely announce such regimes and, to the extent they do
so, it is usually a matter of consequence, not design.
179 See generally Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of
Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1327-33 (1999) (arguing for complete abandonment of
judicial review of agency rulemaking); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 592-98 (1985) (concluding that courts should
defer to agencies where Congress has endowed agencies with significant policymnaking
responsibility); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUm. L. REV. 452, 467-526 (1989) (arguing that judicial deference to agencies is unconstitutional); Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of
Delegated Power.- Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119
HARv. L. REV. 1035, 1049-70 (2006) (arguing that agencies tend to be consistent across
issues but variable over time, while courts tend to be consistent across time but variable
across issues, and that Congress should take these features into account in structuring delegations); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of
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and we intend to rely upon it here. In so doing, we assess the suitability of government actors as providers of transition relief along
familiar administrative metrics, including expertise, political accountability, and susceptibility to capture. In particular, we consider the
strengths and weaknesses of various institutional actors with reference
to the broad and narrow questions of transition relief detailed above.
No government actor will be the perfect decisionmaker at every step.
Our undertaking here is simply to identify comparative advantages
among those institutions that may render some institutions preferable
in certain contexts.
1. The Legislature
Congress is designed to be a democratic actor,' 80 accountable to
the electorate. 181 The legislature is thus well positioned to make
broad, value-laden judgments, and in particular, to assess claims that
the government should afford transition relief on grounds of fairness
or legitimacy. At the same time, there are disadvantages to vesting
control over legal transition relief with Congress. First, Congress may
act not in the public good, but rather to obtain rents.182 This is especially problematic in the context of legal transition relief, given the
extent to which such relief is often the product of rent-seeking. Thus,
for example, commentators have explained how Congress's monopoly
over the allocation of grandfathered sulfur dioxide emissions
allowances under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments led to substantial, and successful, rent-seeking. 83 As discussed above, the incenAgency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 522-29 (evaluating costs and benefits of courts as legal
authority).
180 Cf supra note 169 (identifying commentators who advocate, on grounds of democratic accountability, congressional determination of caps in cap-and-trade pollution
programs).
181 For a critical examination, see Jane S. Schacter, Digitally Democratizing Congress?
Technology and PoliticalAccountability, 89 B.U. L. REV. 641, 643-48 (2009), which questions whether Congress is as accountable as it could be.
182 See, e.g., Nathaniel 0. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins, The Choice
of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 322-25
(1998) (describing legislation as product of supply by legislators and demand by special
interests); Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. S421, S425-29 (2002) (describing argument that property systems are designed to
benefit well-organized interest groups); Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 275, 280-81 (describing argument that legislation tends to be
designed to reward politically powerful groups).
183 See Heinzerling, supra note 163, at 328-32 (explaining that much of allocation of
emissions allowances under national sulfur dioxide trading program established under 1990
amendments to Clean Air Act was attributable to rent-seeking); Joskow & Schmalensee,
supra note 163, at 51-58 (same).
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tive for rent-seeking may be greater with respect to individualized
decisions with clear winners and losers.' 84
Second, procedural hurdles-such as committee consideration,
filibusters, and vetoes-make enacting legislation slow and cumbersome. This feature may facilitate interest groups' ability to obtain
transition relief, even where it may not be warranted. To the extent
that an interest group can credibly threaten to block legislation-and
procedural hurdles can make these threats easier to maintain-we can
expect interest groups to obtain the rents they seek more frequently.
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that Congress is often the
body that has produced the new legal regime in the first instance.
Interested parties can thus threaten to hold up the underlying regime
change until Congress guarantees their relief from the transition.
Third, it is likely that Congress as a whole is not expert in the
area governed by the new legal regime, or with respect to societal
actors impacted by the regime. Indeed, even congressional staffers are
unlikely to enjoy such expertise.' 85 To the extent, then, that expertise
will improve a decisionmaking process, Congress is not the optimal
branch in which to vest authority to engage in that process.
2.

An Executive Branch Agency

The principal advantage of delegating to an agency is the gain in
expertise. 186 This expertise will presumably be of less importance in
the context of legal transition relief than it is in structuring primary
regulation. 187 Still, an agency's expertise might be of some help in formulating the precise structure of transition relief, and also perhaps in
deciding which classes of actors might appropriately be afforded transition relief.
184 See supra note 177 and accompanying text. Congress's freedom to pass laws on an
individualized basis is also limited. See Schiavo ex ret. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223,
1226-27 (11th Cir. 2005) (alluding to, without resolving, possible unconstitutionality of
congressional statute designed to change legal standards to benefit particular plaintiff in
individual case); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1272-75 (11th Cir.
2005) (Birch, J., specially concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that statute
was unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds).
185 See, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 116, at 1959 (stating that, as compared to
agency staff, congressional staffs lack substantive expertise and professional connections).
186 See, e.g., id (noting expertise of agency staff in comparison to congressional committee staff members); William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory
Interaction, and the Quest for Stewardship and IntergenerationalEquity, 77 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1521, 1543 (2009) (noting great expertise of federal regulators as first movers in their
respective areas).
187 Cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portendsfor FDA Preemption of State Law
Products Liability Claims, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 437, 445 (2009) (identifying state law's conflict with "federal regulatory framework" as area that "might fall outside the expertise of
the agency").
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At the same time, executive branch agencies' 88 remain accountable to some degree to the elected members of the legislature and the
executive, and thus to the public.189 This accountability is not as powerful as for a directly elected body such as the legislature,'90 but nonetheless, executive agencies are frequently trusted to make broad,
value-laden judgments. For example, many environmental statutes
vest the EPA with significant policymnaking authority. 191 However, the
threat of capture by regulated parties accompanies accountability,
much as it does for Congress. 192
3.

The Judiciary

We traditionally associate two benefits with judicial decisionmaking. First, judicial independence insulates courts from capture by,
and bias for or against, the parties appearing before them. 193 Second,
deliberation among panels of judges and among courts enhances the
quality of decisions.' 94
On the other hand, courts generally are not accountable for their
individual decisions, as greater independence begets less accountability.' 95 Similarly, courts are very unlikely to have field-specific
expertise. Nor will judges typically be familiar with even general issues
surrounding transition relief. To be sure, the judiciary often must confront its own questions of legal transition relief-whether to apply
new decisions retroactively 96 and whether to abrogate the preceden188 We employ this terminology not to distinguish between agencies such as the EPA
and cabinet-level agencies such as the Department of Labor, but to distinguish between
agencies under the control of the President ("executive branch" agencies) and independent
agencies. The latter are discussed below.
189 See Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of
Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1068-91 (2001) (describing and assessing executive and
legislative oversight of agency rulemaking).
190 Id. at 1091-93.
191 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (upholding congressional delegation to EPA of authority to set standard requisite to protect public health).
192 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.KENT L. REy. 1039, 1064-67 (1997) (noting judicial awareness of risks of agency capture).
193 See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2168, 2171
(2006) (noting that "independence frees judges to make unpopular decisions"); Jonathan
Remy Nash & Rafael 1. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the
Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1752 (2008) (same).
194 See Adeno Addis & Jonathan Remy Nash, Identitarian Anxieties and the Nature of
Inter-tribunalDeliberations,9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 613, 615-17 (2009) (discussing judicial deliberation); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1639, 1644-70 (2003) (discussing judicial collegiality).
195 See Nash, supra note 193, at 2171 (characterizing judicial independence and judicial
accountability as "competing demands upon the judiciary").
196 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Legal Defeasibility in Context and the Emergence of Substantial Indefeasibility, in ESSAYS ON LEGAL DEFEASIBILITY (Jordi Ferrer & Giovanni B.
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tial effect of an earlier decision. But retroactivity is not usually the
primary issue in a case; courts generally rule on retroactivity as a subsidiary issue after they have resolved the principal question on the
merits. Indeed, courts usually resort to set rules1 97 rather than policy
considerations-such as efficiency concers-in resolving retroactivity
questions. 198 Moreover, courts lack an opportunity to gather information beyond what is submitted by the parties who appear before
them.' 99 This further exacerbates the judiciary's deficits in information
and expertise.
4.

Independent Agencies

Independent agencies 2 00 present benefits and downsides similar
to those offered by courts. The raison d'eitre of independent agencies
is, of course, their relative independence from the executive branch 20 '
and thus from the effects of interest group lobbying and rentseeking. 202 This independence is hardly complete, however. Though
Ratti eds., forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 22-26, on file with the New York University
Law Review) (discussing retroactive application of new rules in context of post-conviction
habeas proceedings).
197 See Jill E. Fisch, The Implications of Transition Theory for Stare Decisis, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 93, 97-105 (2003) (describing common law rules regarding stare
decisis).
198 See id. at 105-06 ("[A] merit-based analysis appears insensitive to the values
inherent in the system of stare decisis.").
199 See, e.g., Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for
Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 371-72 (1984) (describing courts' limited
ability to regulate effectively due to information deficit and lack of control over agenda).
200 For an overview of the theory and structure of independent agencies, see generally
Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Establishedby Practice: The Theory and Operation of
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 AOmIN. L. REV. 1111, 1135-63 (2000).
201 See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, The Debate over Independent Agencies in Light of
Empirical Evidence, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215, 218 (noting that independent agencies are more
shielded from executive branch influence than are traditional executive branch agencies).
While administrators of independent agencies do not enjoy life tenure, still they enjoy
some degree of independence by virtue of their extended terms in office and limits on their
removability. Cf Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency
Independence (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No.
10-01, Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 10-02, 2010), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=lS46103 (arguing that rise of hybrid independent-executive
mechanisms decreases independent agency freedom from presidential influence, but noting
that decreased autonomy may also productively increase accountability); Nash & Pardo,
supra note 193, at 1765-69 (arguing that, notwithstanding their lack of life tenure, bankruptcy judges nonetheless enjoy considerable degree of judicial independence).
202 See Buzbee, supra note 186, at 1527 (finding that executive actors are subject to
lobbying by interest groups on regulatory matters); Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and
Limits of Independent Agencies. 1988 DUKE L.J. 257. 259-60 (noting that statutory requirement of bipartisanship is designed to isolate independent regulatory agencies from political
pressure). For commentary questioning the extent of the independence enjoyed by
independent agencies, see generally Symposium, The Independence of Independent Agen-
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independent agencies as entities are not accountable to any political
actor, individual members of an agency may be subject to personal or
political pressure via direct lobbying. It is not uncommon for
employees (or even heads) of independent agencies to leave government service for lucrative employment in the private sector based on
relationships forged during time in the government.203 Accordingly,
even independent agency employees understand that they often face
significant personal incentives to decide regulatory questions in one
direction or another. Nonetheless, independent agencies have frequently been trusted with highly politically sensitive decisions, often
to good effect. 204 At the same time, the tradeoff for this independence
is a comparative lack of democratic accountability; by design,
independent agencies are not responsive to broader public moods or
values. 205 This may make independent agencies ill-suited for broad,
value-laden judgments of the type that come early in the process of
choosing a scheme of regulation or transition relief.
At the same time, independent agencies do have the opportunity
to develop some degree of expertise. 206 Like any other administrative
cies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215; and compare Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the
Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1147-53 (1990), which argues
that even specialized courts that review agency action may develop an agency bias. For
discussion of protections designed to frustrate independent agency bias and to ensure political independence, see Breger & Edles, supra note 200, at 1188-97.
203 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHIi.L. REV. 47,
86-87 (1969) (describing intention of many FTC lawyers to use their experience as means
of obtaining lucrative private sector job after public service).
204 For example, consider the use of independent commissions to recommend military
base closures. See Natalie Hanlon, Military Base Closings:A Study of Government by Commission, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 331, 333-40 (1991).
205 For discussion of independent agency accountability and autonomy as competing
interests, see Breger & Edles, supra note 200, at 1198-1209. For recent scholarship advocating increased reliance on independent agencies, see Bressman & Thompson, supra note
201, at 3, which argues that reliance on independent agencies may allow presidential oversight "sufficient to satisfy political interests and to serve normative values," and Roberta S.
Karmel, The Controversy over Systemic Risk Regulation, BROOK. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1540691, which argues that an independent
agency should regulate systemic financial risk. Recent legislative proposals have also
drawn upon independent agencies as valuable institutional actors. For discussion of the
role of independent agencies in recent health care and global warming legislative proposals, see id. at 46-55.
Note that some independent actors may be temporary (like a one-time commission to
select which military bases to close), while others may be permanent (like the SEC). We
advocate here a permanent agency; an agency with permanence can gather expertise over
time. Cf Adrian Vermeule, Intermittent Institutions (Harvard Law School Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 10-13, 2010), available at http://ssrn.coml
abstract=1542104 (highlighting differences between temporary and permanent governmental institutions and explaining when each type of actor might be more appropriate).
206 The type of expertise that would be relevant here is discussed infra notes 222-24 and
accompanying text.

Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law

May 2010]

44
449

INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF TRANSITION RELIEF

agency, an independent agency can hire staff with technical skill and
can explore complicated policy issues to a degree impossible in a court
or, to a lesser extent, Congress. 207 Independent agencies possess all of
the procedural advantages of an administrative actor: the ability to
conduct studies and accumulate data, the power to take comments
208
from interested parties, the authority to hold hearings, and so forth.
A wide variety of independent federal agencies have acquired strong
reputations for technical competence. 209 Independent agencies might
thus be well-suited to resolving individualized decisions, such as the
allocation of transition relief among eligible parties. 210
Table 1 summarizes the distinctive features of the various government actors we have examined in this Section.
TABLE 1
COMPARING THE FEATURES OF INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS
Good at making
Good at making
broad, valueladen decisions?

Very good
Congress
ExecutiveGodVrgodeyYs
Branch Agency
Goo
Court
Not good
Independent
Not good
Agency

__________________

C.

narrow,
technocratic
decisions?

Prone to
lobbying and
capture?

Armed with (or
able to develop)
relevant
expertise?

Not good

Very

No

Ver goo
Very good
Very good

VeyIe
No
Somewhat

-No
Yes

__________________

Recommendations

The previous Section demonstrated that different institutional
actors offer different benefits within a system designed to apportion

legal transition relief. This differentiation suggests that an optimal
allocation of power with respect to legal transition relief would enlist
multiple institutional actors. 21 ' Vesting all authority over transition
207 See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 202, at 262-63 (noting that independent agencies
develop expertise over time).
208 This depends of course on the agency's organic statute, but most independent agencies possess this type of power (and there is no reason Congress could not confer it if
necessary).
209 See, e.g., Michael J. Borden, The Role of FinancialJournalistsin Corporate Governance, 12 FoRDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 311, 354-55 (2007) (noting superlative regulatory
expertise of SEC).
210 Cf. Verkuil, supra note 202, at 267-72 (providing examples to show independent
agencies are best used in functions that mirror appellate courts, not to administer set
policies).
211 A prominent analogy to the separation of decisionmaking authority between entities
for purposes of providing transition relief appears in the context of environmental risk
regulation. There, "risk assessment" (the determination of whether a risk exists and its
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relief with the same actor that has responsibility for shaping the new
legal regime likely will result in the transition relief contaminating (or
at least threatening to contaminate) the new legal regime itself. While
this may be unavoidable at some level, vesting all authority in one
entity may make it genuinely impossible to enact a new legal regime
without finishing all bargaining over the scope of transition relief.
That, in turn, may serve to increase the amount of lobbying that
attends the structuring of new legal regimes, as private parties exploit
the opportunity to delay the new regime in order to extract transition
relief.
We return here to the three categories of justifications for transition relief that we described in Part 1: "political" justifications, "legitimacy" justifications, and "economic" justifications. In light of these
justifications, we suggest which institutional actors might be best
equipped to make decisions at each of the various stages in the provision of transition relief.
1. Political Considerations
Where Congress or the executive can impose a new legal regime
only if it pays off interested private parties through transition relief,
that relief will necessarily be a part of the construction of the legal
regime itself.212 By hypothesis, affected private parties will not permit
Congress or the executive to proceed with legal change unless they are
confident that they will receive the desired transition relief, which in
many cases will require that the transition relief be built into the legal
regime in finished form. Thus, in many cases, whichever governmental
body creates the new legal regime in the first instance (Congress, an
agency, or the courts) will be forced to provide transition relief at the
same moment.
In other cases, however, the original law or regulation need only
include some promise of transition relief, and not a detailed recitation
scope) is separated from "risk management" (the policy question of how to respond to the
risk identified). See Jonathan Remy Nash, High-Speed Police Chases and the
Constitutional Common Law of Risk Regulation (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
New York University Law Review) (discussing environmental risk assessment and management). One justification for this separation is specialization: Risk assessment raises questions best addressed by experts in science, while risk management introduces questions
best addressed by policy and economic experts. See id. at 7-8. Another justification is that
separation of inquiry avoids the very real risk that policymnakers would otherwise infect,
and even overwhelm, the control of scientific experts over risk assessment. See id. at 8
(discussing how separation of risk management from risk assessment protects integrity of
risk assessment). Put another way, the separation of risk management from risk assessment
helps to ensure the propriety and validity of the entire process.
212 See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing circumstances in which transition relief will be
necessary).
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of which party will receive what benefit. In these instances, the original lawmaking body might be able to leave consideration of the exact
form and recipients of transition relief to an outside actor, such as an
agency or court. 213 One might ask why a group of private actors with
enough power to block enactment of the new legal regime, and thus
presumably with enough power to extract concessions on legal transition relief, would not demand that Congress specifically allocate such
relief. One answer may be that the group is confident that the transition relief that will eventually be offered will be satisfactory. Another
answer is that the group might believe that explicit congressional
assurance will appear too crass and harm its interests in the long
run.2 14

This may also explain why Congress would voluntarily forgo its

apparent ability to extract even higher rents from a group in a position
to deliver them.215 In the end, however, questions of who is best positioned to provide transition relief from a technocratic point of view
are largely inapposite. If transition relief is politically necessary to
secure adoption of a new legal regime, in nearly all cases it must be
provided by the political actor associated with the regime itself.
2.

Legitimacy Considerations

If the rationale for affording transition relief is the fear that
people will perceive a new legal regime as illegitimate or unfair, then a
political actor-and most likely the body that creates the new legal
regime-is best positioned to make decisions regarding transition
relief. In many cases this will be Congress itself; in other cases an
agency will play this role. The choice of actor will be driven in large
part by the question of which institution is best positioned to gauge
both which parties might object on grounds of fairness and what steps
need be taken to alleviate their concerns. Congress, as the institution
most directly accountable to the voters, is the natural choice.
Again, however, it may only be necessary for Congress to indicate a desire to afford some transition relief without spelling out the
213 We return to the question of which outside actors will be best suited to this task infra
Part IV.C.3.
214 See Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty, supra note 7, at 842-43 (arguing that
grandfathered rights are popular because they disguise publicly unpopular cost-benefit
calculus).
215 See id. at 843 (arguing that government choice of transition relief is driven by desire
to create "perception of procedural fairness"). This concern, however, seems not to have
stopped Congress from literally listing the number of free sulfur dioxide allowances being
allocated to coal-fired power plants under the Clean Air Act sulfur dioxide trading program. That method of explicit allocation, however, persisted only under the initial, timelimited first phase of the trading program; the broader second phase allocates allowances
by formula. Nash & Revesz, Markets and Geography, supra note 151, at 584-85.
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precise form or recipients of that relief. A general statement of transition rights, coupled with an opportunity to be heard in front of a neutral judicial or administrative body, will in many cases be sufficient.
More generally, whether the legislature, an executive branch
actor, or an independent agency actor makes decisions regarding transition relief, judicial review can perform a useful constraining function. While the courts are poorly designed to make such decisions in
the first instance, their independence renders them potentially valuable as a backstop. To the extent that either executive branch actors or
independent agencies resolve questions of transition relief pursuant to
a congressional delegation of authority, judicial review should be
available to ensure both that (1) the general format and structure of
transition relief conforms to the delegation of authority; and (2) individual decisions as to transition relief are made appropriately under
the prescribed format and structure. Existing administrative law provides ample basis for both of these types of review.
3.

Economic Considerations

When transition relief is called for because the attendant benefits
outweigh the social costs associated with such relief, 216 or to induce
certain desirable investments 217 the decision of what transition relief
to afford is largely a technocratic one. Here, the multiple steps
involved in the decision to provide transition relief are significant. As
we have explained above, the initial decisions regarding whether to
provide transition relief, and to a lesser extent the form and quantity
of relief to provide, are often quite broad in scope and can involve a
series of value judgments and tradeoffs between priorities. In this
respect, Congress, or a politically accountable executive branch
agency, would appear best situated to render the relevant decision.
However, when it comes to the particular decisions about what
shape transition relief should take and which particular parties should
be entitled to it, the picture changes. Congress appears poorly positioned to make these narrow, individualized, technocratic judgments,
or at least less well positioned than a more expert agency. Thus, as a
general matter, it would make sense for Congress to delegate judgments such as these. 218 There is historical precedent for this approach:
216 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances where balance of social costs favors transition relief).
217 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (noting suggestions of how transition
relief may be used to incentivize socially desirable investments).
218 Michael Graetz has argued that deciding who should receive transition relief is difficult because the effects of a change in the law may have an impact beyond simply the class
of people directly affected by the law. See Graetz, supra note 59, at 77-78. As an example,
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At times Congress has seen fit to authorize transition relief but leave
the details to other actors with closer ties to affected communities and
populations. For example, in an effort to preserve fisheries, Congress
has vested executive branch actors and regionally elected fishery
councils with the authority to distribute grandfathered fishing rights
equitably. 2 19
Not only will an agency often be superior to Congress in the allocation of transition relief, but an independent agency may be even
better situated than a standard executive branch administrator. Once
the decision to grant such relief has been made, expert actors who are
as independent of political influence as possible should determine the
structure and recipients of the relief in order to diminish rent-seeking
to the greatest extent feasible. 220 An independent agency meets these
criteria perhaps better than any other standard government
institution.221
Graetz explains that revision of air transportation regulations might "have financial effects
on the investors, consumers and employees of air carriers, airframe manufacturers, and
airport operators." Id. at 78. The fact that so many classes of societal actors might be
affected may make it challenging, if not impossible, to apportion limited but appropriate
transition relief. Presumably, an expert agency would handle such challenges better. And if
indeed the task proves to be impossible, an expert agency would be best positioned to
come to that conclusion as quickly as possible.
219 See Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty, supra note 7 at 819-20 (describing reliance on
regional fishery councils in development of fishing quota systems).
220 To the extent that compensation is used, the legislature or executive branch agency
should set a cap on the total amount of available relief. Cf. Michael B. Gerrard, N.Y.
Brownflelds Program Buffered by Legislature, Courts, N.Y. L.J., July 25, 2008, at 5
(describing how, where brownfields cleanup program authorized tax credits far in excess of
actual cleanup costs, New York State's Department of Environmental Conservation
"began making it difficult for sites to enter" program in order "[tlo guard the state's treasury from this uncapped exposure").
221 In some sense, the use of an independent agency to decide these questions allows for
retroactive effect without what Jacob Gersen and Eric Posner describe as the downsides of
"Delay Rules," where retroactive legislation is too easily accomplished. Gersen and Posner
explain that Delay Rules offer the benefit of allowing one session of the legislature to
enact general legislation while deferring, and delegating to future legislators, specific
actions. See Gersen & Posner, supra note 1, at 548. Gersen and Posner explain:
Delay Rules facilitate monitoring of agents by the public and reduce the relative influence of interest groups over legislation. Delay allows slow and diffuse
public attention to mobilize, reducing the advantage of well-organized groups
in the legislative process. However, public attention is often short-lived. Once
public attention wanes, private interests can lobby again . .. . Retroactivity,
therefore, allows actors to evade some timing rules. The bias against retroactivity may support the democracy-enhancing facets of Delay Rules on the legislative process.
Id. at 583 (citations omitted). Reliance upon independent agencies that are less subject to
lobbying may allow for greater flexibility in having the government act retroactively
without the attendant loss of benefits from Delay Rules that Gersen and Posner identify.
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This independent agency could of course be the institution that
created the new legal regime, as when the SEC promulgates a new
regulation. Or it could be a stand-alone institution created by
Congress to administer transition relief related to a single law, similar
to the Base Closing Commission. 2 2 2 But Congress could also create an
independent agency dedicated to allocating transition relief across a
wide range of substantive legal areas. That agency might acquire or be
imbued with expertise related to transition relief that transcends particular legal subjects. For example, many statutes require consideration of whether a modification to a grandfathered structure is
"substantial." Again, this type of question arises with respect to environmental law, land use law, and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
among other legal regimes. 22 3 An agency might become skilled at
drawing workable lines related to "substantial" modification across
issue areas. It is also possible that the breadth and number of regulated entities who would come before the agency would again narrow
the possibility of capture. 2 2 4
For instance, consider tax law. As things now stand, taxpayers
who see new tax legislation on the horizon often rush to finalize transactions before the new law-and less favorable tax treatment-takes
effect. 22 5 Such "under-the-wire" investments are inefficient. Kyle
Logue has explained that an ideal transition policy would decrease the
incentive for such investments:
With an ideal transition policy, under-the-wire investments (those
investments that would not have occurred but for the imminent
repeal of the incentive subsidy) would not receive grandfather treatment. At the same time, however, grandfather treatment should be
given to whatever investments were made in reliance on the incentive subsidy's existence, so long as that investment was made prior
to the repeal of the subsidy. One possibility would be for Congress
to try to sort out these two types of investments and grandfather the

222 See supra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing base closures). For discussion
of the effective use of ad hoc commissions to address politically challenging issuesincluding base closures-see Bradford C. Mank, Protecting the Environment for Future
Generations: A Proposalfor a "Republican" Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 444, 489
(1996).
223 See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text (discussing transition issues that transcend subject matter areas).
224 Cf. S. REP. No. 97-275, at 6 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 16 (noting,
with respect to creation of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, that "the subject
matter of the new court will be sufficiently mixed to prevent any special interest from
dominating it").
225 For discussion and criticism of this approach, see Logue, supra note 7, at 1176-80.
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latter but not the former. To do so with perfect accuracy, however,
would be impossible. 226
While Logue may be correct that it would be (at least nearly) impossible for Congress to distinguish between these two types of investments, it is far more plausible that Congress could delegate such
responsibility to an independent agency, which could then resolve
each such claim on a case-by-case basis pursuant to a substantial body
of expertise and experience. 227
To be sure, dividing authority among more than one actor entails
coordination costs and potential delays.228 Yet we believe that the
attendant benefits outweigh those costs. The varying competencies of
different actors are important enough to the attainment of optimal
legal transition relief that the substitution of a less capable institutional actor would seriously impair the final regulatory product.
Ultimately, we are not confident that any government actor-be
it legislative or executive-will succeed in fending off rent-seeking by
powerful interests related to transition relief. The institutional safeguards that we outline in this Part would help to ameliorate the
problem. Implementing these institutional correctives, however,
would require fundamental shifts in power, and it remains unclear
whether Congress has the proper incentives to divest itself of
authority in this fashion. Hopeful signs exist but are far too scattered
to form any basis for generalization. The first-best world remains
elusive.
CONCLUSION

In this Article, we have endeavored to fill major gaps in the
existing literature on legal transition relief. We have argued that the
major impediment to a private market for insurance against legal transitions is pricing. We have also attempted to demonstrate that, while
information and derivative markets conceivably might help to solve
pricing problems, such markets are unlikely to become robust enough
to function properly. Finally, our analysis of the institutional options
226 Id. at 1179-80. Accepting this impossibility, Logue goes on to propose that new tax
laws should be applied prospectively, not from the date of enactment but from the date
that they are originally proposed in Congress. Id. at 1180.
227 Cf. Deborah R. H-ensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass PersonalInjury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1587, 1615-18,
1623-26 (1995) (citing examples of alternative dispute resolution to allocate limited
Dalkon Shield- and asbestos-related injuries, and advocating greater use of such systems in
mass tort litigation).
228 Cf William W. B uzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. Rnv. 1, 17-36 (highlighting that assumption of single government
regulator is incorrect and noting that multiplicity of potential regulators may impose costs).
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available within government compels the conclusion that independent
agencies should play larger roles in distributing transition relief. The
institutional options available within government are not ideal, but
neither have they yet been fully utilized.
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